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ARTICLES

"I'M AN INDIAN OUTLAW, HALF CHEROKEE AND
CHOCTAW": CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
THE QUESTION OF INDIAN STATUS
Weston Meyring 2

ABSTRACT

This Article provides guidance to federal, state, and tribal
courts presented with the question of whether an individual is an
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Although an understanding of the term "Indian" is "[flundamental to virtually all analysis of Indian law,"3 the scholarly literature is devoid of a modem
in-depth review and analysis of who is an Indian under the major
federal criminal statutes. As a result, judges and their law clerks,
most of whom do not specialize in federal Indian law, are left without a comprehensive source for the law, history, and policy needed
to formulate a case-by-case analysis of an issue profoundly affecting
1. TIM McGRAw, Indian Outlaw, on NOT A MOMENT Too SOON (Curb Records 1994).
2. A.B., Brown University, 1995; J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, Magna Cum
Laude, 2005. Member of the Idaho State Bar and the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho. The author is clerking until 2007 for the Honorable Sergio A. Gutierrez
of the Idaho Court of Appeals. The author's views expressed herein do not reflect in any
way the position of the Idaho Court of Appeals. The author may be contacted at
wmeyring@gmail.com.
I wish to thank Bethany Berger, Amy Kelley, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Clay Smith, and
Leslie Weatherhead for their excellent comments on an earlier draft, and Bruce Didesch,
Judge Gutierrez, and Juliana Repp for supporting and encouraging my interest in Indian
law.
For her continued love and faith, special thanks to the former Natalie Lehrman, an
enrolled member of the Spokane Tribe of Indians and, most significant to me, my wife. This
Article is dedicated to my Indian in-laws.
3. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK

38 (Hardy Myers et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK].
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the sovereignty of Indian tribes. This Article explicates the Indian
status test and argues it must be construed broadly as intended by
Congress. Importantly, the Indian status test connotes an expansive view of tribal membership, and, faithfully applied, helps to
avoid potential equal protection
problems raised by the legislative
4
response to Duro v. Reina.
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I don't see how you can simultaneously be an Indian and not be an
5
Indian.
Leslie R. Weatherhead, Attorney for Duane Garvais
[Tihe issue of how one ought to determine Indian status under the
federal statutes governing crimes in Indian country is extraordinarily complex and involves a number of competing policy considerations.6
Judge Henry, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
It is to be expected that in the effort to advance the Indian from his
semi-savage condition, and to change his tribal condition into individual citizenship, many anomalous situations will arise, which
must be viewed in the light of all the legislation upon the same subject. ... 7

Judge Shiras, United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska
For nothing in this world today is more complex, difficult, disputed,
divisive, or so highly charged with dynamic energies as the question
8
of Indianness.

I.

INTRODUCTION

"The case of special agent Duane Garvais has reached Washington's congressional delegation and the highest levels of the
troubled Bureau of Indian Affairs," reported Spokane, Washington's newspaper in 2004. 9 Mr. Garvais was employed by the BIA
due, in part, to the agency's established preference for hiring enrolled member Indians 1 0-a preference mechanism approved by
the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari.11 On his
employment application, Garvais claimed he had a documented
blood degree of five-eighths and was pending enrollment with the
5. Bill Morlin, BIA Firing Complicated by Rulings: Former Agent Garvais' Status as
an Indian Unclear After Conflicts in Two U.S. Courts, THE SPOKEsMAN-REVIEW, July 14,

2004, at B1.The district court considered whether Garvais was an Indian, even though the
BIA had determined he was not an Indian for employment preference purposes. Id.
6. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001).
7. United States v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real Estate Co., 69 F. 886, 891 (Neb. 1895).
8. Louis OWENS, MIXEDBLOOD MESSAGES (1998), quoted in Alan R. Velie, Indian Identity in the Nineties, 23 OKLA.CITY U. L. REV. 189, 189 (1998).
9. Bill Morlin, BIA Agent Says He's a Victim of RetaliationAfter InvestigatingReports
of Police Corruption on Spokane Reservation, He Faces Tribal Charges, THE SPOKESMANREVIEW, Jan. 19, 2004, at Al.
10. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934).
11. 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential"Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002).
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Assiniboine tribe. 12 Four years later, however, while being prosecuted by the Spokane Tribe on charges of mishandling undercover
drug funds, Garvais professed not to be an Indian under the criminal jurisdiction of the tribe. 13 The BIA then terminated his employment after determining that Special Agent Garvais was simply an Indian descendant and not an enrolled member of any federally recognized tribe. 14 Nevertheless, the Spokane Tribe
continued to claim that Garvais was an Indian subject to prosecution in tribal court.
Cases like In re Garvais present an opportunity for courts to
reexamine the federal common law15 pertaining to the definition
of who is an Indian under the criminal jurisdiction statutes.16 After more than one hundred years of acquiescing to Congress' plenary power' 7 to divest tribes of any remaining sovereignty, courts
have been slow to acknowledge recent attempts by Congress to restore tribal sovereignty and encourage self-determination.' 8 Indian law scholars often criticize the courts for failing to properly
weigh modern policy regarding the federal-tribal relationship.' 9
12. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. "This is really judge-made law as to what an Indian is." -Senior U.S. District
Court Judge Justin Quackenbush, quoted in Bill Morlin, Court Ponders Definitionof American Indian; Spokane Tribe Wants to Prosecute Former BIA Agent in Tribal Court, THE
SPoKEsMAN-REVIEw, Aug. 10, 2004, at B3.

16. QUESTION: There's some ambiguity about what Indian refers to. Is it - must it
be someone who is enrolled in an Indian tribe or can it be anyone who is the child of
Indian parents?
MR. KNEEDLER: It - generally, it has been understood to require a tribal affiliation. First of all, the definition under - under the Indian Civil Rights Act for tribal
power, Congress adopted the same meaning of Indian that is applied under the Federal criminal statutes for the purpose of having the two mesh completely.
QUESTION: Yes, but what is that? What is that definition?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107).
17. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 217-20 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982 ed.) [hereinafter STRICKLAND].

18. Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 19 (2004); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court'sPursuit of
States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 281
(2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina
and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of ConstitutionalDimensions, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for OurAge of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 79 (1999)
(criticizing Court for Anglocentric analogical reasoning and for abandoning its canons of
statutory construction). "It is ironic, as well, that this judicial shift [toward bringing the
Constitution to Indian country] has occurred in a time in which the express congressional
and executive policy has been to promote, not undercut, tribal sovereignty." Id. See also
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But in United States v. Lara,20 the United States Supreme Court
validated an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act 21 affirming the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. 22 The unanswered question, not
before the Lara Court, remains whether congressional allowance
of tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians,
violates the equal protection guarantee incorporated within the
23
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The equal protection problem, 24 to a great degree, turns upon
the legal definition of Indian 2 5 and its corollaries - member and
nonmember Indian. 26 While the profession of lawyers and judges
Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdictionof Tribal Courts Over
Non-Member Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70 (1991) (criticizing "judicial narrowing of the
scope and purpose of federal power over Indian affairs to reach only enrolled members of
federally recognized Indian tribes .... " Id. at text following n.41).
20. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990).
22. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
23. Id. at 208-09. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court:
That [due process] argument (if valid) would show that any prosecution of a nonmember Indian under the statute is invalid .... [Wie need not, and we shall not,
consider the merits of Lara's due process claim. Other defendants in tribal proceedings remain free to raise that claim should they wish to do so. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (vesting district courts with jurisdiction over habeas writs from tribal
courts).
Id. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (incorporating equal protection into
Fifth Amendment); see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 931-35 (9th Cir. 2005).
24. QUESTION: Indian tribal members are persons within the United States to
whom the Due Process Clause is applicable. Imagine a tribe that does not give you
counsel in a criminal trial. That could happen. All right? Now, is there a basis under
the Due Process Clause for distinguishing between whether the defendant in such a
case is, A, a member of that tribe; B, a non-tribe member but an Indian; C, a nonIndian?
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 19. See also David Williams, Sometimes
Suspect:A Response to ProfessorGoldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REV. 191 (1991); Carole E.
Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly"Racial: A Response to "Indiansas Peoples," 39 UCLA L.
REV. 169 (1991); David Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991); Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom
Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1489-91
(1991); Peter Tasso, Note, Greywater v. Joshua and Tribal JurisdictionOver Nonmember
Indians, 75 IOWA L. REV. 685 (1990).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J.,
dissenting) (advocating a narrow definition of Indian status to avoid equal protection
problems); Clay R. Smith, "Indian" Status: Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom, ADvOcATE
(Idaho State Bar), Mar. 2003, at 18; Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Basedand Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision,
55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 82-84 (1993); O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1481-89.
26. Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.48:
Consistently interpreting the term 'Indian' as including both members and nonmembers, federal courts have developed a definition of who is an Indian for pur-
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is usually characterized by facility for language, analysis, and
communication, in the realm of federal Indian law many briefs
and opinions are admittedly schizophrenic and indiscriminate
when using terms of Indian status and ethnicity.2 7 In general, a
person can be an ethnic Indian without being a legal Indian; but,
when getting down to specifics, the melding of race and politics
plays havoc with most attempts to achieve precision through language. The legal terms "member Indian" and "nonmember Indian"
create further confusion. 28 As suggested in this Article, those additional terms of art, from the point of view of a specific tribe, differentiate individuals who are recognized as members of the specific tribe from those who are members of another tribe. Member
and nonmember do not necessarily refer to enrollment status in a
tribe. 29 The confusion over definitions and terms makes stare decisis a minefield, even for federal Indian law practitioners. This Article identifies and attempts to clarify the criminal jurisdiction
problem, and shows that equal protection concerns in this context
can be avoided in most cases by adhering to a principled determination of Indian status.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the state of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. Part III surveys the case law, including the pre-Duro v. Reina (Duro II) line of cases endorsed by
Congress as the means to defining Indian status with respect to
federal criminal jurisdiction and to the inherent power of Indian
poses of the federal criminal statutes that also requires a sufficient recognition
and identification in the community as an Indian to prevent the arbitrary application of the term to someone who has had only a tenuous connection with his or her
Indian heritage.
27. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1140-41, 1141 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Duro
I]; David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government as
Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL'v REV. 223, 224 (2001); Dussias, supra note 25, at 80-81;
Patricia Owen, Note, Who is an Indian? Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty
and Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 161, 178-79
(1988).
28. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Duro 11, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641
(1977).
29. Scholars have correctly described "three classes of Indian people" affected by Duro
IL That classification scheme follows the Duro II Court's lexicon in which membership
equals enrollment. This Article, however, rejects an enrollment-confined definition of membership as inconsistent with the subsequent Duro-fix. See infra text accompanying notes
376-77. See also The Duro Decision: CriminalMisdemeanorJurisdictionin Indian Country:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs on H.R. 972, 102nd Cong. 159
(1991) (statement of Philip S. Deloria) ("Now when I tried to ask some people... [in the
Senate] about this, their answer evidently is that they didn't mean enrolled members, they
meant members.").
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tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. Part III
also examines the blood and recognition prongs of the Rogers test
and discusses the many possible interpretations of that test. Part
IV argues that the intent of Congress as expressed in the Duro-fix
legislation mandates a return to a less cramped view of the Rogers
test. Before concluding, Part V of this Article discusses the courts'
role in averting a constitutional crisis, and provides an additional
recommendation to Congress to further address the concerns of
both tribes and nonconsensual parties.
II.

DETERMINING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: NON-INDI4NS,
MEMBER INDIANS AND NONMEMBER INDIANS

Scholars and judges are predicting a constitutional crisis as a
result of the conflict between the individual rights of United
30
States citizens and the group rights of American Indian tribes.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the inherent
sovereignty of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over both
nonmember Indians and member Indians, but declined to address
31
the equal protection question.
The equal protection issue has been brewing ever since the
Court decided in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that Indian
tribes, as "domestic dependent nations," 32 were implicitly divested
of all sovereignty over the prosecution of non-Indians. 3 3 Sixteen
days later, the Court in United States v. Wheeler reaffirmed a
tribe's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over "member"3 4 Indians
as being necessary for control of internal relations and preservation of the tribe's "unique customs and social order." 3 5 Subse30. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality:Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 334-37 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or
Not so Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 271 (2003); L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicamentof Tribes,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 747-48 (2001) [hereinafter Gould, Mixing Bodies].
31. Lara, 541 U.S. at 209-10; see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th
Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that, although Means's equal protection argument had "real
force," Indian tribes do not have to comply with the United States Constitution).
32. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
33. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a chart simplifying
the convolutions of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, see WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 168 (3d ed. 1998).
34. In the context of inherent sovereignty, the Court causes confusion by using the
moniker "member" as shorthand for "enrolled member."
35. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). See also Duro 1H, 495 U.S. 676, 68586 (1990); Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2006

7

184

Montana
Law Review, Vol.
67 [2006],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 67

quently, the circuits split as to whether Indian tribes had been
divested of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians along
with non-Indians.3 6 The Supreme Court in Duro II reversed the
Ninth Circuit by holding that a nonmember Indian's relations
with a tribe are no different than those of a non-Indian. 37 Thus,
Indian tribes were prohibited from intruding on the personal liberties of "nonmember" Indians who by definition did not consent
38
to the governance of the tribe.
Accordingly, the Court determined that tribal jurisdiction
over crimes involving nonmember Indians - to whom the Bill of
Rights would not apply in Indian country3 9 - is inconsistent with
equal treatment of nonmember Indian citizens and non-Indians. 40
As a result, the Duro II decision created a jurisdictional void in
the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA).41 While the so-called Indian exception in the ICCA had given exclusive jurisdiction to the
tribes over misdemeanor crimes committed by an Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, the holding in Duro II
meant that tribes could no longer prosecute "nonmembers"4 2

36. CompareDuro 1, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) with Greywater Y. Joshua, 846 F.2d
486 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Tasso, supra note 24; Owen, supra note 27.
37. Duro 11, 495 U.S. at 688.
38. Id. at 694. See supra note 34. This Article scrutinizes and challenges the Court's
member Indian semantics as unfaithful to federal Indian law's long acceptance of recognized consent.
39. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d
924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
40. Duro H, 495 U.S. at 698. Citizenship was granted to all American Indians in 1924.
See STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 142-43.
41. Eric B. White, Note, Falling Through the Cracks After Duro v. Reina" A Close Look
at a JurisdictionalFailure, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 229, 230 (1991). The ICCA, also
referred to as the Indian General Crimes Act or Federal Enclaves Act, states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case
where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000). "The Supreme Court has interpreted the exception as manifesting
a broad congressional respect for tribal sovereignty in matters affecting only Indians."
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Quiver,
241 U.S. 602 (1916)).
42. See supra note 34.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2

8

2006

Meyring: Criminal
Jurisdiction and the&Question
of Indian
Status
CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
INDIAN
STATUS

185

within the Indian exception, and there was no other statute grant43
ing federal jurisdiction to fill the gap.
Responding to the outcry of the tribes over Duro 11, Congress
immediately enacted temporary legislation to fix the situation created by the Court. 44 That legislation, made permanent a year
later, is referred to as the Duro-fiX.4 5 It amended the definitions
section of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968 to recognize
and affirm the inherent power of Indian tribes "to exercise crimi46
nal jurisdiction over all Indians," not just member Indians.
III.

UNITED STATES V. ROGERS AND ITS PROGENY

Rather than creating a rigid statutory definition of who is an
Indian for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction, 4 7 Congress decided in the Duro-fix to endorse the definition as then developed
by courts interpreting federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act. 48 The test for who is an Indian can be traced at least as far
43. Although nonmembers were shielded from tribal prosecution the same as non-Indians for purposes of Duro, they remained Indians and did not fall into the state's jurisdiction
over crimes committed against non-Indians. See, e.g., Means, 432 F.3d at 933-34:
If Means was not subject to prosecution in the Navajo courts, he could not be prosecuted in any court. The state of Arizona, like the majority of states, does not have
jurisdiction to try Indians for offenses committed on a reservation, and there is no
federal court jurisdiction because Means's alleged offenses do not fall within the
Major Crimes Act.
44. Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat.
1856 (1990) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1983)).
45. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2401-41 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.) [hereinafter
NEWTON]; L. Scott Gould, The CongressionalResponse to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 53, 63 (1994) [hereinafter Gould,
The CongressionalResponse].
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000); see Means, 432 F.3d at 930 ("'All Indians' plainly includes
Indians who are not enrolled members of the particular tribe exercising jurisdiction" but
not "all persons who may be ethnically Indian.").
47. By one count, there are over thirty-three definitions of Indian status contained in
federal statutes and regulations. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1481. For an excellent survey
of the most common definitions, see Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who is an Indian?Searching
for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal IndianLaw, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
275 (2000-2001).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000) states: "'Indian' means any person who would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, Title 18, if that
person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that
section applies." The Major Crimes Act provides:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who
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back as 1846 to the Supreme Court decision of United States v.
Rogers.49 In that case, the defendant was William S. Rogers, a
white man who established his domicile in Cherokee country and
was adopted and recognized by the tribe as an Indian. 50 Although
Rogers exercised the same rights and privileges as any other
Cherokee citizen, the Court held that the statute at issue, an earlier version of the Major Crimes Act, did not contemplate a white
man of mature age being adopted into an Indian tribe. 51 The
Court stated that Indian as used in the act "does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family of
Indians." 5 2 In addition, the Rogers Court determined that Indian
"is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians
53
are regarded as belonging to their race."
Over the one-hundred-sixty years since Rogers, state and federal courts have formulated a test of Indian status that involves
two fundamental prongs: (1) the person has Indian blood; and (2)
54
is recognized as an Indian by the tribe or Indian community.
The Rogers test has been developed by application in many different state courts and federal circuits, but the Supreme Court has
not explicated the test since its decisions from the late nineteenth
century. 5 5 This part of the Article outlines and considers the
has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under
section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
49. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
50. Id. at 567-68.
51. Id. at 572-73.
52. Id. at 573.
53. Id.
54. STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 24. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IN-

DIAN LAW 2 (U.S. Printing Off. 1942, 2d ed., 4th printing 1945) [hereinafter COHEN], available at http://madison.law.ou.edu/cohen/ (defining "'Indian' as a person meeting two qualifications: (a) That some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the white
race, and (b) that the individual is considered an 'Indian' by the community in which he
lives"); accord ELMER F. BENNETT, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (U.S. Printing Off. 1958) [hereinafter BENNETT]; see also NEWTON, supra note 45, at 171-72 (defining "Indian as a person
meeting two qualifications: (a) that some of the individual's ancestors lived in what is now
the United States before its discovery by Europeans, and (b) that the individual is recognized as an Indian by the individual's tribe or community").
55. See United States v. Romero, 136 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the
Rogers test to be a "complex legal definition of Indian status").
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evolution of the two-pronged test in an attempt to identify common law principles that were assumed by Congress to be established precedent at the time of the Duro-fix.
A.

The Blood (orAncestry) Prong

The blood element of the Indian status test has been controversial due to its link to race.5 6 This requirement has been widely
criticized, particularly within the last decade. 5 7 Yet this part of
the test has remained a persistent focus in both state and federal
court decisions.
Initially, the federal courts considered a flurry of cases in the
latter half of the nineteenth century involving white men with no
Indian blood who were adopted by various tribes. 58 In several of
those cases, the men were found to be Indian because certain treaties at issue either granted amnesty to Indian citizens or provided
specific tribes with jurisdiction over all adopted and naturalized
citizens.5 9 In United States v. Ragsdale, the circuit court in the
district of Arkansas noted that Rogers expressly allowed that "a
white man may incorporate himself with an Indian tribe, be
adopted by it, and become a member of the tribe." 60 Because the
Treaty of Washington pardoned all prior crimes committed by
Cherokee citizens, not just by Indians, the court was able to sidestep the Rogers holding that a white man could not be an Indian
for purposes of avoiding federal criminal jurisdiction under the exceptions in the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (a precursor to
the ICCA).6 1 In this fashion, the court declared the white victim in
the case, Richard Newland, to be a Cherokee citizen by adoption,
56. See Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 81-83 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney, J., concurring); see
generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 30; Frank Shockey, "Invidious"AmericanIndian Tribal Sovereignty: Morton v. Mancari, Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Rice v.
Cayetano, and Other Recent Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275 (2001); Gould, Mixing Bodies, supra note 30 (noting the unreliability of modern science as a means for quantifying
race); John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization:It's
a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171 (2000-2001); Gould, The CongressionalResponse, supra
note 45. But see Kim Benita Furumoto & David Theo Goldberg, Boundariesof the Racial
State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law, 17 HARv. BLACKLErrER L.J. 85,
101-09 (2001) ("As a racial presumption, colorblindness continues to conjure people of color
as a problem in virtue of their being of color, in so far as they are not white.").
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. See supra notes 49-52, infra notes 60-62, 76-78.
59. See supra notes 49-52, infra notes 60-62, 76-78.
60. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 686 (Cir. Ct., D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113)
(emphasis added).
61. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
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which meant the federal court had no criminal jurisdiction according to the terms of the treaty. 62
In Ex parte Mayfield, the defendant, accused of committing
adultery, was stipulated to be one-fourth Indian by blood. 63 Since
the crime was victimless, federal court jurisdiction hinged on
whether John Mayfield was Indian. 64 Similar to Ragsdale, however, the Supreme Court avoided the question by finding Mayfield
to be an adopted Cherokee member and thus subject under an
1866 treaty to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation.65
In Westmoreland v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that an indictment describing the defendant and deceased as
white persons, was sufficient for maintaining federal jurisdiction.66 The Court, citing Rogers for support, said the term "Indian"
is descriptive of race. 67 Therefore, the description of the defendant
and victim as white men was enough to prevent the indictment
from being jurisdictionally defective. 68 The indictment further alleged that the defendant and victim were not Indian citizens, 69
thus supporting by implication the holding from Rogers, decided
almost fifty years earlier, that the citizenship inquiry is not de70
pendent upon race.
In Alberty v. United States, the defendant was an undisputed
citizen of the Cherokee Nation. 71 The Supreme Court, again citing
Rogers, cautioned that such citizenship by itself did not make Alberty an Indian under the federal criminal statutes. Absent a preemptive treaty or act of Congress, race remained a key element of
72
jurisdiction.
In Lucas v. United States, the Supreme Court began by observing that the description of the murdered man in the indictment as a negro and not an Indian "implied that there were negroes who were, and those who were not, Indians, in a jurisdictional sense" under the Act of 1890,7 3 in which the territory of

Oklahoma provided "that the judicial tribunals of the Indian Na62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 686.
141 U.S. 107, 113 (1891).
Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 112-16.
155 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1895).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 548 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846)).
162 U.S. 499, 500 (1896).
Id. at 500-01; see infra note 138.
163 U.S. 612, 615 (1896).
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tions shall be allowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil
and criminal cases arising within their country in which members
of the Nation, by nativity or by adoption, shall be the only parties. .... ,,74 On account of this unique Oklahoma statute, the racial
75
portion of the Rogers test did not apply.
Nofire v. United States involved the same treaty and statutory
language that trumped the Rogers test in Alberty.7 6 The murder
victim, Fred Rutherford, was alleged to be a white man and not an
Indian. 77 But since no quantum of Indian blood was required for
Cherokee membership, the Court found Rutherford to be an
adopted Cherokee without making further racial inquiry. 78 Nofire
was the last Supreme Court case to consider whether a person
without Indian blood who was adopted as a member of an Indian
tribe could be an Indian under the federal law of criminal jurisdic79
tion.
In the twentieth century, most of the cases defining Indian for
criminal jurisdiction purposes involved basic measurement of Indian blood as implied by Rogers. 0 Treaties were not a frequent
consideration, since the federal government ended treaty making
with Indian tribes in 1871.81 In 1912, the Eighth Circuit found
one-eighth Indian blood enough for Indian status.8 2 In Ex parte
Pero, one petitioner was a full-blood and the other had a full-blood
74. Alberty, 162 U.S. at 502 (quoting Treaty with Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art.
13, 14 Stat. 803). This quoted language of the Treaty was followed in the Act of 1890. Id. at
502-03.
75. Lucas, 163 U.S. at 616.
76. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id. at 658, 661-62.
79. The Montana Supreme Court considered the issue of non-racial Indian status in
State v. Montana Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., 257 Mont. 512, 851 P.2d 405 (1993).
80. Shortly after the Indian Rights Act was passed in 1934, the BIA was charged with
devising a method:
to certify individuals who claimed to be half-blood Indian. The Bureau based its
determination on five factors: 1) tribal rolls; 2) testimony of the applicant; 3) affidavits from people familiar with the applicant; 4) findings of an anthropologist;
and 5) testimony of the applicant that he has retained "a considerable measure of
Indian culture and habits of living." As explained in a 1936 memo written by Collier, "Determination of the degree of Indian blood is entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence; there is no known sure or scientific proof. Nor has any legal
standard of universal applicability been set up by statute for the determination of
who is, and who is not, an Indian."
Brownell, supra note 47, at 288.
81. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
82. Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1912). The Eighth Circuit also held
that one-quarter to three-eighths Indian blood was sufficient. Venzina v. United States,
245 F. 411, 420 (1917). But see Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (holding
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mother and a half-blood father; a sufficient indication of Indian
race in each instance.8 3 In 1968, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that "since 1846 - and perhaps earlier" the legal test for
Indian status involved a "substantial percentage of Indian
blood."84 In 1974, The Arizona Supreme Court assumed, without
deciding, that a defendant had a substantial percentage of Indian
blood if his father was half-Indian.85 The court, however, cited a
California Supreme Court opinion cautioning that a significant
blood quantum is not dispositive of Indian status because of the
possibility that the individual has been emancipated (or assimilated) and thus should be treated like any non-Indian.8 6
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit held that one-fourth Indian by
blood is enough to satisfy the first prong of the Rogers test.8 7 That
same year, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty declaring threefourths degree of blood to be sufficient.88 In 1982, the Wyoming
Supreme Court, in a parsimonious application of the blood prong,
held that one-eighth Indian blood is too little for Indian status.8 9
The court supported its conclusion by employing the "substantial
amount of Indian blood" terminology from Ex parte Pero and
resorting to a strict dictionary definition for the meaning of substantial. 90 Justice Brown, writing for the court, praised Professor
Robert Clinton's classic article on Indian criminal jurisdiction, but
seemingly ignored that scholar's synthesis of the Indian status
test and the conclusion that it merely requires "some demonstrable biological identification as an Indian."91 A few months later, in
Goforth v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that slightly less than one-quarter Indian blood was a significant
92
percentage.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Torres, determined
that both 25/64 degree Indian blood and 11/32 degree of Indian
blood indicated "some degree of Indian blood" under the Rogers
one-eighth Indian blood is not a "substantial amount of Indian blood" to classify a defendant in a criminal case as Indian).
83. 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938).
84. Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (Wash. 1968).
85. State v. Attebery, 519 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974).
86. Id. at 54 (citing People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954)).
87. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1976).
88. United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
89. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 79 (referring to Robert Clinton, CriminalJurisdiction over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503, 520 (1976)).

92. 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
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test. 93 In 1988, the Idaho Court of Appeals declined to decide
whether 15/64 Indian blood degree was significant, because the
defendant did not pass the recognition prong of the two-element
test. 9 4 Four months later, the district court in South Dakota con95
cluded that 15/32 Indian blood was sufficient for the Rogers test.
This same court held in another case that 7/32 Indian blood meets
the Rogers criterion of "some Indian blood," notwithstanding one
96
of the defendant's parents being a non-Indian.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Montana found that 165/512 of
Indian blood was significant. 9 7 Later that year, the Utah Court of
Appeals opined "five-sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies as a
'significant percentage,' the historical debate treated in the cases
focusing on whether two-sixteenths is enough."9 8 The court further noted that the blood requirement of the Indian status test is
more rigid than the recognition requirement. 9 9 In 1993, the Montana high court heard the case of a defendant, Don Juneau, who
had no Indian blood but had an Indian father by adoption. 10 0 Because the court concluded that Juneau was not recognized by a
tribe, it did not think it necessary to address the blood prong of the
Rogers test, but noted the argument that the prong is inconsistent
with the modern notion of being Indian as a political status rather
than a racial classification. 10 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in
1995, affirmed the South Dakota federal district court's finding,
under the recognition prong, that defendant was a non-Indian,
and affirmed without review that 11/128 Indian blood would satisfy the Rogers inquiry. 10 2 And, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that one-quarter Indian blood is a degree of blood that satisfies
10 3
the Rogers test.
In a notable early decision of the twenty-first century regarding Indian status for criminal jurisdiction, the Washington Court
of Appeals held that a defendant conceded to be a descendant and
member of the Sturgeon Lake First Nation, a Canadian Indian
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
(1993).
101.
102.
103.

733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984).
State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 1988).
United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991).
State v. LaPier, 242 Mont. 335, 341-42, 790 P.2d 983 (1990) [ hereinafter LaPier11.
State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745, 748 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
State v. Montana Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., 257 Mont. 512, 515 851 P.2d 405, 407
Id. at 516-17, 851 P.2d at 407-08.
United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
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tribe, was clearly established as an Indian under the first Rogers
prong.' 0 4 Also in 2001, the Tenth Circuit held that evidence of Indian membership by itself is not evidence of blood sufficient to
meet the first prong of Rogers.'0 5 The following year, in a case
before the Idaho Court of Appeals, the parties agreed that a significant percentage of blood was present in a defendant whose
mother was a full-blooded Indian and whose father was an Afri06
can-American.,
Judge Quackenbush, in a 2004 memorandum opinion for the
Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Washington,
found that "The maximum Indian blood possessed by Duane
Garvais in any federally recognized Indian Tribe is 1/16th Kootenai and 1/16th Colville,"107 seemingly implying that blood is fortified by maximizing the blood quantum from a particular tribe.' 0 8
Garvais' blood degree in other recognized tribes was 1/32 Yankton
Sioux and 1/32 Santee Sioux, for a total blood quantum of 3/16,
much less than the "documented blood degree of 5/8" he had
claimed on his application for BIA employment.1 0 9 Moreover, the
court took the position that a limited blood quantum weighed
heavily against a determination of Indian status when the recognition prong of the Rogers test was tenuous. 1 10
In United States v. Bruce, a Montana district court joined the
Eighth Circuit in concluding that one-eighth blood is enough to
satisfy the first prong."' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
"[blecause the general requirement is only of 'some' blood, evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is
clearly identified as an Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this
prong." 112 Judge Rymer, in dissent, argued that the Rogers test
requirement of "some" blood is not enough. 1 13 According to Judge
Rymer, the quantum of blood must be at the level required by each
tribe for enrollment. 1 14 Under this theory, the dissent implied that
104. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
105. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001).
106. Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
107. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1221-22.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-26 (9th Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 1223.
113. Id. at 1235 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1235 n.6 ("Whether or not one-eighth blood is sufficient in some cases, there
is no evidence in this case that it would suffice for purposes of membership in, or identification with, any relevant tribe.").
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an individual must share the same bloodline as the recognizing
tribe. 1 15
B.

The Recognition Prong

A significant quantum of scholarly ink has been spilled criticizing the "vampire" prong of the Rogers test. 11 6 Yet only cursory
review has been given to the recognition prong. 11 7 This section of
the Article identifies many overlapping types of fact patterns,
showcases factors that courts have considered when assessing the
second prong of the Rogers test, and illuminates various methods
adopted by courts in construing the meaning of recognition. Then,
in Part IV, this Article analyzes the original meaning of the recognition prong and the implication of the Duro-fix policy as a return
to a culturally relevant," 8 socio-political method of recognition.
1.

Formal'19 Recognition by an Indian Tribe or the Federal

Government
a)

Membership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction

As mentioned in Part III.A., many cases heard by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century involved individuals
who were ancestrally non-Indian, yet considered to be members of
Indian tribes by adoption. 1 20 The Court made clear that those individuals, though not "racially" Indian as required for criminal jurisdiction under the Rogers test, were recognized, nonetheless, as
115. Id.
116. See supra note 56.
117. COHEN, supra note 54, at 2-5; Clinton, supra note 91, at 513-20 (analyzing recognition prong); see generally Bethany R. Berger, "Power over this Unfortunate Race": Race,
Politics, and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004);
Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts:Applying the Myths and the Methods
of Marbury v. Madison to TribalCourts' CriminalJurisdiction,36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 77, 111-16
(2004); Christine Metteer, The Trust Doctrine, Sovereignty, and Membership: Determining
Who Is Indian, 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 53 (2003); Snowden et al., supra note 56; Brown-

ell, supra note 47; Eric Henderson, Ancestry and Casino Dollars in the Formationof Tribal
Identity, 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 7 (1998); Gould, The CongressionalResponse, supra
note 45; Dussias, supra note 25.
118. William C. Wantland, An Essay: The Ignorance of Ignorance:CulturalBarriersBetween Indians and Non-Indians, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (1975) ("Indians who live in a
dominant non-Indian society find it necessary to live in two cultures, that is, we have to be
bicultural.").
119. The terms "formal" and "informal" are subjective. The placement of the following
cases is therefore meant to facilitate fact pattern comparisons and further analysis.
120. See supra notes 49-53, 71-78.
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Indian citizens. 121 It was further suggested by the Rogers court
that Indian status is regarded from the Indian race viewpoint.122
Recognition as an Indian depended on the usages and customs of
all Indians.1 23 In other words, pan-Indian culture was the standard by which Indian recognition was to be measured. Once recognized, an Indian would be governed by the usages and customs of
1 24
their own tribe and other tribes.
i) Recognized as an Indian
Chief Justice Taney noted that William S. Rogers had, in fact,
become a formally recognized member of the Cherokee tribe. 125 He
had voluntarily moved to Cherokee country with the intent of
making it his permanent home and had "incorporated himself
with the said tribe of Indians as one of them, and was so treated,
recognized, and adopted by the said tribe, and the proper authorities thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian."1 26 But for Roger's lack of Indian blood, he would have
been deemed Indian.
Similarly, in Ragsdale, Judge Johnson stated that, under
Cherokee laws and usages, Richard Newland was recognized as a
citizen of the tribe. 127 Moreover, by his marriage to a Cherokee
woman, he was "entitled to all the rights and privileges, civil and
political, which belonged to any other citizen of the [Cherokee] Nation." 128 Nearly fifty years later, however, the Supreme Court

found that marriage to a freed African-American woman who was
a Cherokee citizen did not confer the right to vote or other privileges of Cherokee citizenship on Phil Duncan.1 29 Apparently, a
Cherokee woman by blood could confer citizenship by marriage,
but a non-Indian Cherokee citizen could not. 130 The district court
next noted indications that the United States government also
121. See supra notes 49-53, 71-78.
122. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 572.
126. Id. at 571.
127. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 685 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113).
128. Id.
129. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896).
130. See also Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 658, 662 (1897); Boffv. Burney, 168
U.S. 218, 223 (1897); Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 78-79, 95 (1906) (holding that
marrying a Cherokee Indian by blood prior to 1875 resulted in entitlement to similar citizenship per capita rights as Cherokee Indians by blood, but with other limitations).
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recognized Newland's Indian status. 1 31 Based on his Cherokee
membership, Newland had received "transportation money, rations, and a year's subsistence" from the United States government three years after his marriage when the Cherokees were re132
moved to west of the Mississippi.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the 1893 State v. Campbell
case, considered an act of adultery committed within the exterior
boundaries of the White Earth Reservation. 13 3 One defendant,
John Belonge, was determined by the court to be an Indian because he lived on the reservation, retained his tribal relations, received annuities from the United States government, and was
under the supervision of a government agent. 134 Justice Mitchell
noted that the tribe "still retained [its] tribal organization, and
w[as] under the care and supervision of the federal govern35
ment."'
In Nofire, Justice Brewer explained that white men who were
married to Cherokee women were adopted citizens while living in
Cherokee country, according to Cherokee law.' 36 The Court found
that Fred Rutherford not only fit those criteria, but also identified
himself as a citizen, voted in a Cherokee election, continued to
hold himself out as a Cherokee citizen and was recognized as a
citizen by the tribe. 3 7 Although, under treaties and acts involving
the Cherokee Nation, 38 Rutherford was held to be within the jurisdiction of Cherokee Nation courts, his lack of Indian ancestry
39
prevented him from being an Indian under the Rogers test.
In 1933, the Montana Attorney General argued that Bud
Phelps, convicted of stealing cattle on the Crow Indian Reservation, was not an Indian under the "two elements in the test by
which it is determined that an accused is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the United States; (1) He must be an
Indian, that is, of some degree of Indian blood, and (2) he must not
131. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 685.
132. Id.
133. 55 N.W. 553, 553 (Minn. 1893).
134. Id. at 553-54.
135. Id. at 553.
136. 164 U.S. 657, 658 (1897).
137. Id. at 660-62.
138. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 502 (citing Cherokee treaty of 1866 and
the Act of May 2, 1890, which affirmed Cherokee court jurisdiction in all cases involving
only "members of the Nation, by nativity or by adoption").
139. Compare Nofire, 164 U.S. at 662, with Alberty, 162 U.S. at 500-01 (Because Alberty
had no Indian blood, the 1866 treaty with the Cherokee Nation could not prevent his nonIndian status resulting from the Rogers holding.).
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have been emancipated."140 The court, however, held that Mr.
Phelps was by law an Indian because he was listed on a Crow Indian tribe membership roll approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and he had received annuities and a trust patent of a thousand acres of allotted land. Therefore, Justice Matthews determined that the defendant continued to be "recognized by the tribe
14 1
and by the government authorities as of the Indian race."
Ex parte Pero142 is a frequently cited case from the Seventh
Circuit decided nearly one hundred years after Rogers. In analyzing the question of who is an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, Judge Treanor cited Rogers for the proposition
that Indian usages and customs define Indian status.143 As to petitioner, Jerry Pero, a full-blooded Indian, the court found his receipt of allotted lands was not in fee-simple, but was either by
means of a trust patent or a patent in fee with restrictions. 144 The
court thus held that Pero remained under federal guardianship as
an Indian ward of the United States and, contrary to the contention of the warden of the Wisconsin State Prison, had not been
145
emancipated from his tribal bonds.
In 1959, the Washington Supreme Court granted a writ of
habeas corpus to Agnes Monroe, an enrolled member of the Blackfoot-Cree tribe who pled guilty to being an accomplice in the commission of grand larceny on the Yakama Indian Reservation. 1 46 In
support of Monroe's Indian status, Justice Weaver noted that she
147
had maintained her tribal relations.
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Lossiah, held that
there was sufficient evidence to prove Indian status for purposes
of federal jurisdiction when the defendant had three-quarters
Eastern Cherokee blood and there was a "certificate of the Tribal
Enrollment Officer of the Eastern band of Cherokee Indians that
defendant is on Revised Roll No. 3902."148
In United States v. Antelope, the United States Supreme
Court noted that defendants were "enrolled members of the Coeur
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Brief for Appellant, State v. Phelps, 93 Mont. 277, 19 P.2d 319 (1933) (No. 7,037).
Phelps, 93 Mont. at 288, 19 P.2d at 321.
99 F.2d 28 (1938).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 35.
Id.
In re Monroe, 346 P.2d 667, 667 (Wash. 1959).
Id.
537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
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1 49
d'Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations."
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, declined to
say whether nonenrolled Indians have Indian status under the
Major Crimes Act, but did note Ex parte Pero's holding that enrollment in a recognized tribe is not a sine qua non for federal jurisdiction, "at least where the Indian defendant lived on the reservation and 'maintained tribal relations with the Indians
thereon."' 150 In United States v. Broncheau, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Major Crimes Act does not require an indictment alleging
the Indian to be enrolled. 151 Judge Blaine Anderson cited Ex parte
Pero and Cohen's 1942 Handbook, among other sources, to support an understanding that "[elnrollment is the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, but it is not the only
15 2
means nor is it necessarily determinative."
In a matter involving two enrolled members of the Menominee Indian Tribe, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the lower court with instructions for deciding whether
Bernard Smith, the party who lived off of the reservation, was a
non-Indian. 53 First, the court stated that status as a citizen of a
state does not preclude status as an Indian. 5 4 Next, the court followed the totality of circumstances approach from State v. Allan,
and mentioned several factors - habits, racial status, and lifestyle
- noting that "place of residence could be important evidence of
whether Smith has adopted a non-Indian lifestyle." 5 5 Finally,
Judge Cane observed that "the federal policy of promoting Indian
self-government is clearest when all components of a transaction
are reservation-based." 5 6
In Torres, the Seventh Circuit held that certificates of tribal
enrollment and evidence of dividend payments from the Menominee Tribal Enterprises exclusively to the enrolled members of
the Tribe were sufficient, along with evidence of some blood, to
support a jury finding of Indian status. 5 7 The court also approved
the following jury instruction:
149. 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.7 (1977).
150. Id. (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938)).
151. 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1979).
152. Id. ("[E]nrollment has not yet been held to be an absolute requirement of federal
jurisdiction .... Nor should it be.").
153. Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
154. Id. at 429.
155. Id. at 430, see infra notes 166-71.
156. Id. at 431.
157. 733 F.2d 449, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1984).
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To be considered an Indian, a person must have some degree of Indian blood, and must be recognized as an Indian. In considering
whether a person is recognized as an Indian, you may consider such
factors, whether a person is recognized as an Indian by an Indian
tribe, or society of Indians. Whether a person is recognized as an
Indian by the federal government, whether a person resides on an
Indian reservation, and whether a person holds himself out as an
Indian. It is not necessary that all of these factors be present, rather
you as jurors must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining
as a factual matter whether each defendant is an In8
dian. 15

ii)

Not Recognized as an Indian

In 1921, the Ninth Circuit, in Louie v. United States, deter-

mined that a member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Indians, who
had received funds disbursed to tribal members, was a non-Indian
because he held a patent in fee to land within the reservation and
had been declared competent by an agent of the Department of
Indian Affairs. 159 Judge Hunt, writing for the majority, reasoned
that Congress, by expressly making fee-simple patent allottees
subject to state law, "in a sense, abandoned its guardianship of
Louie and has left him subject to all the privileges and burdens of
one sui juris." 160 The court indicated that the General Allotment

Act was a "radical departure" from prevailing Indian policy, but
decided that such intent was made clear by the language of the
16 1
statute.
158. Id. at 456.
159. 274 F. 47, 48, 51 (9th Cir. 1921).
160. Id. at 51.
161. Id. The United States Supreme Court, in examining the General Allotment Act
(Dawes Act), opined that "[c]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians,
or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their protection,"
but held that "the dissolution of the tribal relation was in contemplation" after the title to
the land was no longer held by the United States in trust. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S.
591, 598-99 (1916). See also State v. Columbia George, 65 P. 604, 609-10 (Or. 1901):
The intendment of the latter clause is not so clear, but if it be conceded that the
purpose therefor[e] is to extend citizenship by the mere act of allotment, without
requiring of the allottees the adoption of the habits of civilized life, - about which
there is some doubt, - the federal courts seem to have considered that such citizenship is not inconsistent with the continuation of tribal existence, relations, and
affiliations. * ** It would seem, therefore, that citizenship, such as extends within
the purview of the Daws [sic] act to Indian allottees, is neither inconsistent nor
incompatible with the status of a tribal Indian; that the government, while it has
bestowed citizenship, has not thereby relinquished the guardianship of the
tribes....
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In 1929, the Montana Supreme Court considered the case of
Louis Monroe, who had been born a member of the Blackfeet tribe
and had been a police officer on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation
for ten or fifteen years. 162 The court held that Monroe was a citizen of Montana, however, and accountable to its laws because he
16 3
had been allotted patent in fee land under the 1877 Dawes Act.
Chief Justice Callaway wrote that Monroe had lost his Indian status and now "stood in the shoes of a white man" - the "color line
ha[ving] faded out."' 64 And, in 1954, the California Supreme
Court decided that Indian status is lost, for example, if an ethnic
Indian takes on "civilized habits" and severs tribal relations or if
the individual receives "a conveyance of allotted lands by patent in
165
fee from the federal government."
b)

Nonmembership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
i) Recognized as an Indian

In Allan, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an enrolled
member of one tribe is not emancipated merely by virtue of residing on the reservation of a different tribe. 166 Ralph Joseph Allan
was an enrolled member of the federally recognized Quinault
Tribe of Indians. 6 7 He had a share of an allotment on the
Quinault Reservation, but was living on the Coeur d'Alene Indian
Reservation when he allegedly bribed a deputy sheriff of Kootenai
County.' 68 Chief Justice Donaldson, writing for a unanimous
court, applied the totality of the circumstances approach to the
recognition prong, as synthesized from case law by Professor Clinton, and decided that "Allan ha[d] not severed his relations with
the Quinault Tribe.' 6 9 In a detailed concurring opinion, Justice
McFadden noted that "[tihe cases uniformly regard this factual
issue [i.e. living off of the reservation, and taking up a non-Indian
lifestyle] as pertinent, despite the fact that the reservation system
itself imposed a non-Indian lifestyle on many tribes."' 7 0 But where
a person maintained tribal relations with any federally recognized
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

State v. Monroe, 83 Mont. 556, 274 P. 840, 841 (1929).
Id., 274 P. at 843.
Id., 274 P. at 843.
People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954).
State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 429 (Idaho 1980).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 433 n.2 (McFadden, J., specially concurring).
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Indian tribe, Justice McFadden found a multitude of cases holding
the individual to be an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction
as a nonmember Indian guest on another reservation. 171
ii)Not Recognized as an Indian
Mary Campbell, a defendant in Campbell before the Minnesota Supreme Court, was raised on a farm outside the reservation
by her white father and an Indian mother "who did not sustain
any tribal relations."1 72 Campbell married a white man and continued to live in Pine County up until a short time before she committed adultery. 173 The court said without a doubt she was a not a
"tribal Indian," even though she had collected one annuity payment as an Indian after moving to the White Earth Reserva74
tion.1
In United States v. Heath, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the federal court had jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act over a defendant who was stipulated to be an Indian member
of the terminated Kiamath Tribe of Indians. 175 The language of
the Klamath Termination Act related specifically to membership
in the tribe and provided that "all statutes of the United States
which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no
longer be applicable to the members of the tribe."176 The court decided that terminated Klamath Indians were obviously anthropologically Indian but were no longer afforded Indian status. 177
Judge Jameson, writing for the court, did not address whether the
defendant, Betty Jean Heath, might have regained Indian status
by becoming an informal member of another tribe - perhaps the
Warm Springs Indian Tribe where the act of voluntary manslaughter was committed.' 78
171. Id. at 432-33. See also United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1976)
(recognizing Williams as enrolled nonmember Indian); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d
924, 935 (9th Cir. 2005).
172. State v. Campbell, 55 N.W. 553, 554 (Minn. 1893).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 509 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 19.
177. Id.; see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Antelope
suggests that Indians 'emancipated from tribal relations' or whose tribes have been terminated are not subject to the Major Crimes Act even if they are 'racially to be classified as
'Indians."").
178. Heath, 509 F.2d at 17; Clinton, supra note 91, at 518 n.75. Cf.Means, 432 F.3d at
934 (deciding not to consider whether Mancari political status would apply if defendant
"had been expelled from or had voluntarily and formally withdrawn from his tribe").
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In Lapier v. McCormick (LaPierII), a Ninth Circuit panel consisting of Judges Wright, Fletcher, and Canby, affirmed a non-Indian status determination of a lower court, but embraced a different analytical framework. 179 The court introduced a "threshold
question" that must be answered "yes" to proceed to the recognition prong: is the Indian tribe with which an individual claims an
affiliation acknowledged by the federal government? 18 0 LaPier did
not pass the threshold because he only alleged an affiliation with
the Little Shell Band of Landless Chippewa Indians of Montana, a
tribe not federally recognized. 1 8 ' However, the court did not foreclose the argument that LaPier might have claimed an affiliation
with the Blackfeet Tribe - on whose reservation the crime occurred - even though he did not have any ancestors from that
tribe. 8 2 Such an approach would treat the Rogers prongs as independent; in other words, blood need not be from the recognizing
tribe.
2. Informal Recognition via Significant Contacts
a)

Informal Membership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
i) Recognized as an Indian

In Famous Smith, the victim, James Gentry, was found by the
Supreme Court to be an Indian. 8 3 First, Justice Brown noted that
Gentry had held himself out to be a Cherokee Indian and was so
recognized in general.' 8 4 The Court further noted Gentry moved to
the Cherokee Nation after living in the Choctaw Nation. 8 5 Although it is apparent that Gentry was not an enrolled member of
the tribe, the Court considered that his father "was recognized as
an Indian, and appears to have been enrolled and participated in
the payment of 'bread money' to the Cherokees."' 8 6 The evidence
cited in opposition to the Indian claim was that Gentry had not
been permitted to vote in a Cherokee Nation election and he had
179. 986 F.2d 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter LaPierIII.
180. Id. at 304-05. See State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 24 n.28 (Conn. 1997) (noting list
of "Indian tribal entities that have a government-to-government relationship with the
United States" was first published by the BIA in 1979).
181. LaPier11, 986 F.2d at 306.
182. Id. at 306 n.5.
183. Smith v. United States, 141 U.S. 50, 56 (1894) [hereinafter Famous Smith].
184. Id. at 54.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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lived for an unspecified amount of time outside of Indian country. 8 7 Any negative inferences based on the voting eligibility,
however, were dismissed by the Court because Gentry had not yet
fulfilled the six-month residency requirement for voting privileges. 18 8 Moreover, one of the election judges had expressed confidence that Gentry was a [Cherokee] Indian; the implication being
that he was also a citizen of the Nation, since only citizens were
allowed to vote.1 8 9 Finally, the Court discussed the effect of Gentry having lived for some time as a resident of the state of Arkansas. 190 There was no evidence of "how he came to live there, under
what circumstances, or how long he lived there;" factors the Court
said had the tendency of pointing to non-Indian status-either of
one who was always a non-Indian or one who had severed his ties
to any tribe.' 9 1 The Court held that a person who is an Indian does
not lose that status due to temporary residence outside of Indian
country when there is no indication of intent to sever the tribal
affiliation and the tribe still exists and is recognized by the federal
government. 192
Moore, the other petitioner in Ex parte Pero, had his domicile
on the Bad River Indian Reservation and actively associated with
the reservation Indians, but "had not been enrolled with any Indian tribe or on any reservation."1 9 3 In Moore's case, the court
held that non-enrollment did not bar Indian status. 194 Judge
Treanor cited two Eighth Circuit cases and an Indiana case in
support of this holding. 195 In dicta, the court stated that enrollment does serve as evidence of Indian status. 1 96 The court concluded that Moore was an Indian because he was recognized as an
Indian and his full-blood mother, half-blood father, and relatives
resided on the reservation and were recognized as Indians by
19 7
other Indians.
187. Id. at 54-55.
188. Id. at 54.
189. Famous Smith, 141 U.S. at 55.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)); see United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d
16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (regarding termination of Indian tribe).
193. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (1938) (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 31.
195. Vezina v. United States, 245 F.411 (8th Cir. 1917); Sully v. United States, 195 F.
113 (C.C.S.D.S.D. 1912); Doe ex dem. LaFontaine v. Avalina, 8 Ind. 6 (1856).
196. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 32.
197. Id. at 30-31.
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More than one-hundred-forty years after Rogers, a federal district court in South Dakota redefined the Rogers test by submitting what are now referred to as the St. Cloud factors.198 While
the St. Cloud factors have been cited on a relatively frequent basis
since being published in 1988,199 only one other court mentioned
the factors prior to the enactment of the Duro-fiX.20 0 According to
Chief Judge Donald J. Porter:
In declining order of importance, these factors are:
1) enrollment in a tribe;
2) government recognition formally and informally through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians;
3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and
4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life.
These factors do not establish a precise formula for determining
the analysis of whether
who is an Indian. Rather, they merely20guide
1
a person is recognized as an Indian.

Richard St. Cloud was an enrolled member of a terminated
tribe 20 2 - the Ponca Indian Tribe. 20 3 St. Cloud moved to the Lower
Brule Sioux Indian Reservation, married an enrolled member of
that tribe, and had children who were tribal members. 20 4 After
living on the reservation for ten years, he applied for enrollment,
but was denied because the Yankton Sioux Tribe's constitution
prohibited "[persons who are enrolled with another Tribe of Indians and who have shared as members in allotments of land/or
20 5
payments, excluding inherited interests, from any other tribe."
Because he was not an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux
198. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
199. See, e.g., LaPier1, 242 Mont. 335, 340-41, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (1990); State v. Hagen,
802 P.2d 745, 748 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 88889 (D.S.D. 1991); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 933 (Utah 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995); People v. Bowen, Nos. 185415, 189441, 1996 WL
33357554, at *1 (Mich. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 24 (Conn. 1997)
("The four factors enumerated in St. Cloud have emerged as a widely accepted test for
Indian status in the federal courts."); State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 653-54 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001); see also United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005).
200. LaPier 1, 242 Mont. at 340-41, 790 P.2d at 986.
201. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
202. AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing termination);
STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 811 (discussing termination).
203. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1458.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1458 n.6.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2006

27

204

Montana
Law Review, Vol.
67 [2006],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 67

Tribe, St. Cloud could not vote in tribal elections and20 was
not
6
given a higher priority in tribal employment programs.
Applying its recognition prong factor analysis, the court first
stated that enrollment in this case was not determinative of Indian status. 20 7 The effect of termination was not explicitly included in the factor analysis, rather it was intended to be a separate inquiry. 208 Under the government recognition factor, the
court noted that St. Cloud, as a terminated Indian, did not receive
general assistance benefits. 20 9 Moreover, the court discounted
benefits, such as federal housing assistance, that St. Cloud had
received as a non-Indian living on the reservation while married
to an Indian. 210 Next, the court determined that St. Cloud had enjoyed the benefits of tribal affiliation through some job assistance,
tribal counseling and alcohol treatment programs. 21 ' Social recog2
nition as an Indian was the final factor considered by the court. 21
Here, Judge Porter found St. Cloud to be "a member of the Indian
community;" a "participa[nt] in Indian social life;" and a self-identified Indian. The fact that St. Cloud was "not at all integrated
into non-Indian society" seems to have been viewed as a positive
attribute of Indian status for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 21 3
Based on its factor analysis, the St. Cloud court concluded
that the defendant had a "sufficient non-racial link" to the tribe presumably the Yankton Sioux Indian Tribe. 214 However, due to
the termination of the Ponca Tribe and the fact that St. Cloud's
name was listed on the roll of that tribe, the court surmised that
the trust relationship between the federal government and St.
Cloud had been terminated. 215 In support of that proposition,
Judge Porter cited Heath, the only court at that time to have considered the issue, and dicta from Antelope. 21 6 The court did not
consider the possibility of Indian status resulting from St. Cloud's
informal membership in the Yankton Sioux tribe, and the tribe
did not intervene on his behalf.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1458.
Id. at 1461.
Id. at 1461 n.10.
St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
Id. at 1462.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Wantland, supra note 118, at 4-5.
St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
Id. at 1464-65.
Id. at 1464.
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In Duro v. Reina (Duro I), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
did not cite St. Cloud. Instead, the court applied the totality of the
circumstances approach to the recognition prong. 2 17 Albert Duro
was an enrolled member of the Torrez-Martinez band of Mission
Indians and had lived one year on that tribe's reservation. 2 18 For
three-and-one-half months, Duro lived on the Salt River Indian
Reservation, during which time he was alleged to have discharged
a firearm - a misdemeanor. 2 19 The shot killed an enrolled member
Indian of the Gila River Indian Tribe. 220 The Ninth Circuit held
that "extending tribal court criminal jurisdiction to nonmember
Indians who have significant contacts with a reservation does not
amount to a racial classification." 22 1 In Duro I, the relevant contacts were that "[h]e was closely associated with the [Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian] Community through his girlfriend, a Community member, his residence with her family on the Reservation,
and his employment with the [Tribe's] PiCopa Construction Com22 2
pany."
In United States v. Drewry, the Tenth Circuit adopted the St.
Cloud factors in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a
jury finding of guilt on four counts of child abuse. 22 3 The court
found that the United States had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the tribe recognized the children as Indians. 2 24 As to
the first factor, tribal enrollment, Judge Seymour noticed that the
children were officially enrolled in the Comanche Tribe, but that
two of the alleged acts had occurred prior to enrollment. 2 25 Instead of relying on the enrollment factor, the court found evidence
sufficient to satisfy a finding of Indian status under the other St.
Cloud factors. 22 6 The supporting evidence was as follows: Indian
Medical Services provided health care to the children based on an
Indian classification; the Comanche tribal chairman had directed
that the children be admitted to a summer camp for Comanche
children only and had vouched for their status as Comanches; the
children attended pow-wows; and, the Tribe's Indian Child Wel217. Duro 1, 851 F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 1138.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1145.
222. Id. at 1144. The PiCopa Construction Company was not restricted to members of
the Community. Id. at 1138.
223. 365 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1103 (2005).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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fare Office had taken custody of the children on the basis of their
227
eligibility as Comanches.
In Bruce, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
the United States District Court for the District of Montana which
had relied on both the lack of enrollment and federal government
recognition in determining that Violet Bruce had not met her burden of producing sufficient evidence of her Indian status. 2 28 Judge
Bybee, writing for the majority, held that the second prong of the
Rogers test does not mandate federal recognition. 2 2 9 Citing United
States v. Keys, Lewis v. State, and Ex parte Pero for support, the
majority affirmed the possibility of informal membership in a
tribe. 230 The court found "strong evidence of tribal recognition" in
that Bruce was born and resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation; she had participated in Indian ceremonies - for example, a
sweat lodge ritual; she had received medical care at Poplar Indian
Health Services and at the Spotted Bull Treatment Center on several occasions; two of her children were enrolled tribal members;
and, most significantly, according to the majority, she had been
arrested numerous times and treated as an Indian by tribal au23 1
thorities.
Judge Rymer dissented in Bruce "because until now, no one
has ever held that an adult may be an Indian (for purposes of legal
status, not for purposes of ethnicity) when she is neither enrolled
as a member of a tribe nor eligible for membership, nor entitled to
tribal or government benefits to which only Indians are entitled."23 2 The dissent described enrollment as the "common thread"
of Indian status. 2 33 Judge Rymer did not think that Bruce's con227. Id.; cf. United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150 (8th Cir. 1995).
228. 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (2005).
229. Id. at 1225.
230. Id. at 1224-25 (citing State v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Lewis v.
State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); Exparte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (1938)). "The
lack of enrollment... is not determinative of status .... [T]he refusal of the Department of
Interior to enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not necessarily an
administrative determination that the person is not an Indian." Id. at 1224 (quoting Ex
parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31).
231. Id. at 1226-27. Additional facts were that Ms. Bruce "associate[d] with Indian persons," "was married for a time to an Indian," and her mother was an enrolled member of
the Turtle Mountain Tribe of Oklahoma. Id. at 1231, 1235. According to the dissent, there
was no evidence that Ms. Bruce held herself out as an Indian. Id. at 1232 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1231. The effect of the test proposed by the dissent would render moot the
first prong of the Rogers test. See id. at 1225 (majority opinion).
233. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1232-33 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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tacts with the tribe were significant. 234 Rather, ignoring the spirit
of the Duro-fix entirely, the dissent noted that Bruce's blood was
not the same as the tribe exercising criminal jurisdiction and
23 5
found her ties to be typical of many non-Indians.
ii)

Not Recognized as an Indian

In 1900, a federal circuit court in Washington outlined the
prongs of the Rogers test, and then narrowed the recognition inquiry to the circumstances of the individual's birth.23 6 Judge Hanford, writing for the majority, declared it was common knowledge
that some "half-breed 23 7 children of unmarried Indian mothers
never do have the recognition, support, or care from their fathers
....They grow up among Indians, and live as Indians, and are as
much the subject of governmental concern as Indians full
blood." 238 However, in this particular case, the defendant was
born off the reservation to a white man and Indian woman mar2 39
ried in accordance with the laws of the Washington territory.
Although he had lived on the then Yakima Reservation for almost
twenty years, the court found that his class status was fixed at
birth. Thus, the defendant was distinguished as a non-Indian, "as
240
any other civilized people are distinct from savages."
234. Id. at 1231-32, 1235.
235. Id. at 1235.
236. United States v. Hadley, 99 F. 437, 438 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1900).
237. A variant of the "half-breed classification" test utilized by the Hadley court was
followed by the Montana district court in evaluating a taxation case where the petitioner
was born in Indian country to a Canadian Frenchman father and a Piegan Indian mother.
United States v. Higgins, 103 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Mont. 1900) [hereinafter Higgins I].His
mother was adopted into the Flathead Indian Tribe with the consent of the head chief and
chiefs of the tribe, and her children were also recognized as members. Id. The petitioner,
Alexander Matt, thereafter lived on the Flathead Indian Reservation for twenty-six years.
Nonetheless, the tax collector of Missoula County claimed that Matt's status must follow
that of his father, a white man, since a white man, even if adopted by a tribe, "cannot
escape his responsibilities as a white man." Id. Judge Knowles, after conducting an extensive review of the recognition of half-breeds by the federal government, held that Matt was
an Indian because he was born in Indian country; neither he nor his parents ever severed
their tribal relations; he was treated by the government as an Indian, and his father was
not shown to be a United States citizen. Id. at 349-52; see also United States v. Higgins, 110
F. 609, 611 (C.C.D. Mont. 1901) [hereinafter Higgins II].
For further discussion of various
mixedblood status tests utilized by courts in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, see generally Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal IndianLaw
to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006).
238. Hadley, 99 F. at 438.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. Higgins (Higgins II), Judge
Knowles adopted the citizenship by birthplace test for mixedbloods, 2 4 1 and was able to distinguish his United States v. Higgins
(Higgins I) holding in what appears to be a rather absurd result
from today's vantage point.2 42 Oliver Gibeau, the petitioner, was
born in Missoula County to a white father and a Spokane Indian
mother. 24 3 When he was seventeen years old, Gibeau's mother
(and later his father) moved with him to the Flathead Indian Reservation, where his mother applied and was admitted as a member of the Nation. 2 44 Gibeau grew up on the reservation and became chief of the Indian police. 24 5 The court asked, "[d]id the fact
of his going upon the reservation with his mother, and adopting
the habits of the Indians, change his status?" 24 6 The court answered, "By Indian polity he might, by them, be classed as an In24 7
dian, but not by the constitution and laws of the United States."
In Vialpando v. State, before the Wyoming Supreme Court in
1982, Dennis Vialpando lived on the Wind River Indian Reservation of the Shoshone Tribe for many years, and it was stipulated
that he "has been recognized as an Indian by the Shoshone Indian
Tribe and others."248 Vialpando held a non-enrolled Indian fishing
permit for the reservation rather than the permit given to nonIndians. In the appendix of stipulated facts attached to the court's
opinion and summarized therein, the State conceded: "Dennis Vialpando takes great pride in his Indian ancestry and heritage and
in fact this criminal action arose out of his efforts to enforce tribal
game and fish regulations against three whites who were fishing
on the Wind River Indian Reservation without non-Indian fishing
permits." 24 9 Moreover, his father and paternal grandmother were
enrolled members of the Shoshone Indian Tribe; he frequently visited his Indian relatives; he had used his free medical benefits at a
BIA health clinic; he attended pow-wows and other Indian cultural events, and brought his children along to help instill an ap2 50
preciation for Indian heritage.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See supra note 237.
Higgins 11, 110 F. at 611.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id.; cf. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 611.

248. 640 P.2d 77, 81 (Wyo. 1982).
249. Id.
250. Id.
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After reviewing Ex parte Pero and subsequent cases, the Vialpando court decided to adopt the test of "substantial amount of
Indian blood plus a racial status in fact as an Indian;" racial status encompassing recognition by the Indian tribe, society in general, or the federal government. The court reversed the logic of Ex
parte Pero so as to imply that non-enrollment is evidence of nonIndian status, yet appeared to agree with other courts that no one
factor is dispositive. 25 1 The factors considered by the court were
enrollment (and eligibility for enrollment), lifestyle, residence,
and employment. 25 2 Because Vialpando was not enrolled in any
tribe nor eligible for Shoshone enrollment and was "employed by
drilling companies which 'work all over the eastern and western
United States"' (supposedly indicating a non-Indian lifestyle), the
court found he was not recognized as an Indian. 2 53 The court conceded Vialpando did have an Indian lifestyle with respect to recreation and visitation, but dismissed other cultural affiliations, such
as those provided by pow-wows, for not being restricted to Indians. 25 4 In concurring, Justice Rooney stressed that lack of enrollment here was the proper basis for the finding of non-Indian status, and argued that the blood prong should be discarded as ra255
cist.
The Montana Supreme Court was the only court to adopt the
St. Cloud factors prior to the Duro-fix legislation. 256 In LaPier v.
State (LaPierI), the court stated that LaPier was affiliated with
the Little Shell Band of Landless Chippewa Indians of Montana
and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas - with a blood quantum combined from those tribes. 2 57 Although the crime occurred
on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, the court did not indicate a
possible affiliation with the Blackfeet Tribe. 25 8 Justice Weber,
writing for the court, agreed that LaPier's lack of formal enrollment was not dispositive, but also implied it was a significant negative indicator. 25 9 Moving on to the second St. Cloud factor, the
251. Id. at 79-80.
252. Id. at 80.
253. Id. The court equates "racial status in fact as an Indian" with the recognition prong
from Rogers.
254. Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 81.
255. Id. at 81-83 (Rooney, J., concurring).
256. LaPier I, 242 Mont. 335, 341, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (1990).
257. Id., 790 P.2d at 986.
258. Cf LaPier II, 986 F.2d 303, 306 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that LaPier had
'abandoned on appeal any argument that he is affiliated with.., the Blackfeet Tribe of the
Blackfeet Reservation of Montana").
259. LaPier I, 242 Mont. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987.
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court noted that the Indian health service benefits received by LaPier "were not reserved solely for Indians." 26 0 The court, however,
did give weight to the fact that he received educational assistance
and attended a college sponsored by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA). 2 6 1 The court did not mention anything under the third St.
Cloud factor ("enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation"), although LaPier's multiple prosecutions in tribal court may be a benefit for
those like him who claim Indian status. 26 2 Facts considered by the
court to be relevant to the fourth St. Cloud factor were that LaPier
lived all of his life off the reservation except for a few summers
and one year of high school; he was "employed on an all-Indian
fire fighting crew;" he "occasionally played basketball on all-Indian basketball teams;" and he "occasionally attended Browning
Indian Days" and Indian "give aways." 26 3 In conclusion, the court
determined that "the record reveals an integration into non-In2 64
dian society, and an absence of cultural identity as an Indian."
State ex rel. Poll v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court is
another case arising from the Blackfeet Reservation. 26 5 The defendant, Don Juneau, had no Indian blood but was adopted by an
26 6
Indian and spent his entire life on the reservation.
Don Juneau testified that he is not enrolled as a member of any
federally recognized Indian tribe; he does not vote in Indian elections; he does not receive any per capita federal benefits as an Indian; and, he has never held a Tribal office. * * *
Defendants contend that although Don Juneau is not a tribal member and he has no Indian blood, everything else about his life is Indian; he was adopted by an Indian; attended Indian schools; practiced the Indian religion; participated in tribal customs; married an
267
Indian; has Indian friends; and, has Indian children.

The court nevertheless concluded that the recognition prong was
not satisfied due to non-enrollment and ineligibility for federal
2 68
benefits.
In 1995, a divided Eighth Circuit panel decided United States
v. Lawrence.26 9 The question was whether the alleged victim of
260. Id. at 343, 790 P.2d at 988.
261. Id., 790 P.2d at 987-88.
262. Id. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987; see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1226-27
(2005) ("arrested Indian").
263. Lapier 1, 242 Mont. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987.
264. Id. at 343, 790 P.2d at 988.
265. 257 Mont. 512, 513, 851 P.2d 405, 405 (1993).
266. Id. at 515, 851 P.2d at 406.
267. Id., 851 P.2d at 407.
268. Id.
269. 51 F.3d 150 (8th Cir. 1995).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2

34

2006

Meyring: Criminal Jurisdiction and the Question of Indian Status

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION & INDIAN STATUS

211

sexual child abuse was an Indian.2 7 0 The critical facts were that
seven months prior to the alleged incident,
the Oglala Sioux, acting through the tribal court, affirmatively intervened to assume responsibility for the care and protection of this
girl. The child had been abandoned in Las Vegas and had subsequently been relegated to a shelter there. Acting at the request of
the child's grandmother, who was unable to act herself on behalf of
the child, the tribe asserted its right of intervention under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 and acquired jurisdiction over the custody proceedings. The
Oglala Sioux tribal court exercised its authority to make the girl a
ward of the court and she was moved from Nevada to the Oglala
Sioux reservation.
The tribal court then placed her in the care of her
271
grandmother.

The majority categorized the tribal court's involvement under
the third St. Cloud factor: "enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation."2 72 In this situation, however, the court did not think the
tribe's actions rose to the level of recognition. 2 73 The dissenting
opinion chastised the lower court for "trivializ[ing]" the tribal
court's choice "to cloak this girl in the security of a wardship."2 7 4
The dissent also took issue with the St. Cloud factors' narrow designation of tribal enrollment as the sole means of official tribal
recognition. 2 75 Judge McKay opined: "The majority, although attributing some importance to the actions of the tribal court, minimizes their significance by relegating its consideration of those actions to the third (and third least important) prong of the framework suggested in St. Cloud v. United States."2 7 6
In the In re Garvais case, mentioned at the beginning of this
Article, Senior United States District Judge Quackenbush concluded that Duane Garvais was not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Spokane Tribal Court; 277 finding that:
Garvais' connections to Indian life were for a limited duration. He
was never regarded by members of either the Spokane or Colville
Tribes as being an enrolled member of any Tribe. He was only regarded as one who
had Indian blood by reason of being a descendant
2 78
of an Indian.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 154-55 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 153 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 155 n.2 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 155 n.1.

276. Id. at 155; cf. United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding tribal
recognition of children under lesser St. Cloud factors).
277. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
278. Id.
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In re Garvais illustrates the ambiguities of the Rogers test,
and it illuminates the clash between narrow notions of political
consent and cultural forms of group identity. As a non-enrolled
individual, Garvais was not eligible to vote in Spokane tribal elections or receive tribal per capita payments. 2 79 He did not have
Spokane tribal rights to hunt or fish, but, as a descendant of an
enrolled Colville member, he occasionally received medical care at
the Colville Tribal Health Service. 28 0 Garvais' ex-wife testified
that he had participated in Indian activities such as Indian basketball games and pow-wows. 28 1 His connections to Indian spirituality included sweathouse use and "possession of a sacred Indian
feather in his truck."2 2 Garvais lived on the Spokane Indian Reservation for nineteen months while employed as a BIA police officer.28 3 And, on his BIA employment application, Garvais stated:
"I am pending enrollment with the Assiniboine tribe in the near
future with a documented blood degree of 5/8."284 Importantly, although the Spokane Tribe knew that Garvais was not an enrolled
or recognized member of any other tribe, it allegedly recognized
him to be an informal member Indian within the criminal jurisdiction of the Spokane Tribe. 2 5 Nonetheless, according to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington,
28 6
Garvais was not an Indian.
b)

Nonmembership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction

In State v. Hagen, Robert P. Hagen was convicted of selling
marijuana within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation. 28 7 Hagen was not an enrolled member
of any tribe, but he testified to being "a member of the Little Shell
Tribe of Chippewa Indians." 2 8 Hagen further testified "that he
has lived on Indian reservations all his life, that he has attended
reservation school and been treated at reservation hospitals, . ..
[and] that he had received proceeds from a judgment entered in
favor of various bands of the Chippewas pursuant to a distribution
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1223.
Id.
In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1222, 1226.
Id. at 1226.
802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on other grounds).
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
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Judge Orme, writing

for a unanimous court, concluded there was "simply no way" that
290
Hagen was recognized as a non-Indian.
3.

Informal Recognition in Absence of Significant Contacts
a)

Recognized as an Indian

In United States v. Dodge, the Eighth Circuit employed the
Rogers test in determining both appellants to be Indian under the
Major Crimes Act with respect to crimes committed on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation during the occupation of Wounded
Knee. 29 1 One appellant, Manuel M. Alvarado, applied three-anda-half years earlier to be entered on the judgment rolls of California as a member of the Yurok Tribe, and claimed to know the
number of his previous entry on a judgment roll in 1950.292 The
court implied that recognition by the federal government was possible because Alvarado had held himself out as an Indian eligible
for enrollment. (Another appellant, Terry Gene Williams, was an
enrolled member of the Pawnee Tribe.) 29 3 The Dodge court was
the first court after the passage of the 1924 Citizenship Act 29 4 to
expressly include federal government recognition in the second
prong of the Rogers test, in addition to tribal recognition. 2 95 For
support, Judge Heaney cited the now controversial 1958 version of
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law which had been
revised to present a viewpoint more favorable to the federal government. 29 6 The 1982 and 2005 editions agree, in line with Ex
parte Pero and modern opinions, that the Rogers test recognition
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 538 F.2d 770, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1976).
292. Id.
293. Id.; cf State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426 (Idaho 1980) (similarly involving formally recognized nonmember Indian); supra notes 166-71.
294. Dodge, 538 F.2d at 785-87; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1979) (citing Dodge, 538 F.2d at 786) was the first Ninth Circuit opinion to add governmental recognition to the Rogers test.
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
296. See Joseph F. Rarick, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, 1982 Edition, 11 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 85, 85 (1986) (book review) ("The 1958 book is a self-confessed
product of the switch of congressional policy from tolerance to termination. . ."). The socalled "Bennett Handbook" of 1958, named after another Solicitor for the Department of
Interior, was meant to "foreclos[e], if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier edition
by judges, lawyers, and laymen." BENNETT", supra note 54, at 1. See also STRICKLAND, supra
note 17, at ix ("The 1958 edition did not reflect Felix Cohen's work. Many of Cohen's carefully considered conclusions were discarded.").
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prong does not require federal recognition. The original Handbook published in 1942, however, does cite a pre-1924 Act case for
the proposition that "[w]ithin the meaning of those various statutes which though applicable to Indians do not define them ...
courts have heeded both recognition by the tribe or society of Indians and recognition by the Federal Government as expressed in
2 97
treaty and statute."
The locus of the crime in United States v. Pemberton was the
Red Lake Indian Reservation, where Arnold Pemberton was born,
attended primary and secondary school, and continued to live. 2 98
Although Pemberton "was not an enrolled member of any tribe,"
he testified to being an Indian. 299 Judge Bye's unanimous opinion
found sufficient evidence of Indian status because Pemberton held
3 00
himself out to be Indian (and was of Indian blood).
b) Not Recognized as an Indian
In 1887, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Ketchum,
adjudged that Ketchum, a full blooded Indian, was not legally an
Indian.3 0 ' There the defendant did not appear to be recognized as
a member of any Indian tribe, and the tribe of his ancestors was
not recognized by the government. 30 2 Moreover, "it appeared that
he had lived among the whites for several years. Ketchum had his
own cabin, and about three acres of land around it, which he culti30 3
vated, and on which he raised vegetables."
In 1901, the Washington Supreme Court considered the case
of State v. Howard, involving a conviction for manslaughter occurring on the Puyallup Indian Reservation. 30 4 The evidence did not
show that Howard had ever lived on the reservation, but he did
appear to have attended the Puyallup Indian school. 30 5 There was
also no evidence that Howard had ties to his parents' tribes. 30 6 For
297. COHEN, supra note 54, at 3.

298. 405 F.3d 656, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2005).
299. Id. at 658.
300. Id. at 660. The rendition of the Rogers rule in Pemberton is problematic because the
Court, perhaps unintentionally, implies that enrollment equals recognition and that the
Court must go beyond the recognition prong for other indicia of recognition and self-identification.
301. 15 P. 353 (Cal. 1887).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 74 P. 382, 383 (Wash. 1903).
305. Id.
306. Id.
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several years prior to the criminal act, Howard lived with his fam30 7
ily apart from any tribe, and worked for the Gentry Bros.' show.
The court held that the defendant had not demonstrated sustained tribal relations and thus the state court had jurisdiction
over him as a non-Indian. 30 8 Judge Hadley, writing for the majority, further analyzed whether the Major Crimes Act applied to all
Indians by ancestry or only to tribal Indians. 30 9 First, it was noted
that the language from United States v. Kagama inferred "that
3 10
the offending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe."
Next, the court acknowledged it had not found any cases wherein
an Indian by blood with no tribal relations had been tried under
the Act. 3 1 1 The court concluded that "an Indian who is not allied
3 12
with any tribe" is no longer a subject of federal guardianship.
In People ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, in which an Oneida
descendant committed a crime on the Onondaga Reservation, a
lower court of New York cited a rule that "the status of an Indian
may be proved by general reputation or his residence upon a reservation."3 13 The court then proceeded to find the defendant, who
had lived on and off the Onondaga Reservation for thirty-three
years, to be treated as a non-Indian for the purpose of state jurisdiction. 3 14 Judge Cheney labeled Rosanna Schuyler a "sojourning
31 5
Indian" who was not a member of the Onondaga tribe.
In State v. Attebery, the defendant was a Cherokee Indian by
ancestry but his only association with an Indian tribe was when,
many years earlier, he lived for three months on the Apache Reservation. 31 6 The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the defendant's father resided on a Cherokee reservation; however, this was
weighed against the fact that the father had never lived on the
Gila River Indian Reservation where the crime occurred. 31 7 The
307. Id. at 383-84.
308. Id. at 384.
309. Id. at 384-85.
310. Howard, 74 P. at 384 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886)).
311. Id. at 385.
312. Id.
313. 205 N.Y.S. 888, 889-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924) (citing Charbonneau v. DeLorimier, 8
Que. Pr. 115).
314. Id. The Onondagas are one of the Six Nations in New York State. Id. at 891.
315. Id. at 894. But cf State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 433 (Idaho 1980) (McFadden, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing Schulyer on basis of the "Very unusual relationship between
the state of New York and the Odondagas and Oneidas").
316. 519 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974).
317. Id.
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court held that the defendant was a non-Indian under the second
3 18
prong of the Rogers test.

In State v. Bonaparte, the Idaho Court of Appeals focused on
recognition of Indian status by the federal government because
there was no evidence supporting tribal recognition. 31 9 Incidentally, the court noted that under the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Allan, "Bonaparte would have been entitled to recognition
as an Indian had he been a member of any tribe, regardless of the
reservation on which he resided."320 As to the claim of federal government recognition, the court evaluated eligibility for social programs and the treatment of descendants of enrolled tribal members under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.321 Judge

Burnett opined:
[Tihe criteria governing social program eligibility do not embody the
objectives of criminal jurisdiction. Neither do we construe the IRA
to place the imprimatur of Indian status, for criminal jurisdiction

purposes, upon all present-day "descendants" residing on reservations, irrespective of their degree of Indian blood or their lack of
32 2
tribal recognition.

Since Douglas Bonaparte was not an enrolled member of any
tribe, was not eligible for enrollment in the Nez Perce Tribe with
which he alleged an affiliation, and there was no "substantial indicia of federal recognition," the court determined he was non-Indian. 323 Judge Burnett, in dicta, concluded that the frequent federal court refrain - that non-enrollment is not a factor dispositive
of Indian status for criminal jurisdiction - suggests "a mistaken
enrollment does not confer federal jurisdiction."324 Moreover, he
posited that an unreasonable denial of recognition by a tribe, as
opposed to the simple lack of recognition in the instant case,
would not bar federal jurisdiction. 325
In United States v. Driver,Judge Porter had another opportunity to employ his St. Cloud factors. 326 As to the first factor, the
court stated that the defendant's eligibility for enrollment was not
a consideration. 3 2 7 The only corroborated evidence of government
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id.
759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 85 n.1 (citing Allan, 607 P.2d at 426).
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
Bonaparte, 759 P.2d at 86.
755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991).
Id.
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assistance was that Driver once received medical treatment available to enrolled members, such as his father, and Driver's children.3 28 Finally, in regard to the third and fourth factors, the

court decided that Driver's "sporadic visits" to the reservation "did
not rise to the level of enjoying 'the benefits of tribal affiliation' or
'living on the reservation and participating in Indian social

life."' 32 9

In Lewis, the Idaho Court of Appeals alluded to the St. Cloud
factors as requiring "significant affiliation" rather than "minor
contacts with the reservation and tribes." 330 Lewis was not enrolled in any tribe. 331 His contacts with the Fort Hall Indian Reservation (where the crime occurred) entailed living on the reservation when he was a young child; having a brother and sister who
were enrolled members; co-owning some property on the reservation; and once attending the Shoshone-Bannock Indian festival as
a child.3 3 2 Judge Lansing determined that the defendant was a

non-Indian on account of the absence of any significant contacts:
Lewis did not apply for tribal enrollment nor express an interest
in doing so prior to his criminal conviction; he maintained no tribal relations nor significant contact with his relatives; he did not
participate in tribal activities other than the one-time festival
visit; he had no record of reservation employment; he did not seek
any federal benefits available for Indians; and he had no personal
contact with Indian religions. 333
C. Various Interpretationsof the Rogers Test
It is evident from a chronological view of twentieth century
cases exhibited above that the pendulum has swung from an emphasis on social recognition to political recognition 334 of Indian
328. Id. at 888-89, 889 n.9.
329. Id. at 889.
330. 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). The Idaho Court of Appeals applied a clearerror standard of review. Id. But see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying de novo standard of review).
331. Lewis, 55 P.3d at 878.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See Means's characterization of Indian status as requiring political recognition:
"Taken together, the 1990 Amendments, the Major Crimes Act, andAntelope mean that the
criminal jurisdiction of tribes over 'all Indians' recognized by the 1990 Amendments means
all of Indian ancestry who are also Indians by political affiliation, not all who are racially
Indians." Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2006

41

Montana
Law Review, Vol.
67 [2006],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

218

Vol. 67

status. 33 5 This shift in common law stems from congressional policies of assimilation and termination, the notion of dual allegiances
resulting from United States v. Nice33 6 and the Citizenship Act of
1924, and courts' growing sensitivity to perceived racism 33 7 and
equal protection concerns. 3 38 Although there has always been a
quasi-political element to the Rogers test, status prior to 1916 was
generally made plain by the rigid constraints of single citizenship. 3 39 The path for an Indian to become a citizen of the United
States involved the severing of tribal relations, and the steps
taken were not to be lightly inferred. Thus, until the Citizenship
Act, Indian status often precluded the possibility of United States
citizenship.
Felix Cohen described the courts' pre-1924 analysis of the Indian status recognition prong as "heed [ing] both recognition by the
tribe or society of Indians and recognition by the Federal Government as expressed in treaty and statute."340 The treaties and statutes referred to were those recognizing mixed-blood individuals as
Indians, since courts were reluctant to hold that a person was deprived by birth of the privileges and benefits of United States citi34 1
zenship.
The role of the federal courts in the aftermath of the Dawes
Act can be characterized as protecting Indian status from states
eager to assert state sovereignty over patent-in-fee Indians.
Hence, recognition by the federal government was construed by
federal courts to affirm Indian status. All inferences were to be
drawn to the benefit of finding continued federal guardianship
34 2
over the individual.
With the Congressional policy change toward fostering tribal
343
government, signaled by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
34 4
and the concept of tribal rolls carried over from the Dawes Act,
the stage was set for using formal enrollment as the courts' pri335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra Part III.B.
241 U.S. 591 (1916).
See, e.g., Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 81 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney, J., concurring).
See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J.,

dissenting).

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at 26-27, 30-31.
COHEN, supra note 54, at 3.
Id. at 3 n.14.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 187-88 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter GETCHES ET
CASES AND

AND
AL.,

MATERIALS].

344. Id. at 141.
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mary tool under the Rogers recognition prong. In his 1976 article
on criminal jurisdiction, Professor Clinton may have been reacting
to the "enrollment as recognition" trend 3 45 by restating the Rogers
test with an emphasis on social recognition. 3 46 The Dodge Court,
two years later, dropped the reference to recognition by treaty and
statute, 3 47 and simply phrased the recognition prong as "recognition by a tribe or society of Indians or by the federal government."3 48 With courts favoring brevity, Dodge became an oft-cited
rule. Both the Strickland version of Cohen's Indian Law Handbook and the Canby Nutshell sought to restore the Rogers second
prong to "an Indian must be regarded as an Indian by his or her
community," 34 9 but those efforts do not appear to have corrected
the not-so-innocent detour from the well-established path of the
Rogers test. The unintended consequence of Dodge is a judicial focus on tribal rolls, which embody the politics of conquest, not necessarily the politics of Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court catalyzed an even greater emphasis on
the political aspects of recognition with its Mancari and Antelope
opinions. As Professor Clinton's JurisdictionalMaze article went
to press, the editors noted:
Part 3 of the Court's opinion [in Antelope], in suggesting that the
jurisdictional term "Indian" is not a racial classification, seems to
approve in dicta a definition which is not solely based on racial ancestry and social recognition, as suggested herein, but which also
of the tribe of the derequires some political and legal recognition
3 50
fendant by the federal government.

Responding to footnote seven of Antelope, 3 5 1 the Eighth and Ninth
circuits in St. Cloud 35 2 and LaPierH,35 3 respectively, incorporated
federal recognition of the tribe as an addition to the Rogers test.
Counsel for Duane Garvais sought to further embellish the
Rogers test by inserting the federally-recognized tribe require345. Enrollment or eligibility for enrollment is advocated by Judge Rymer as the bright
line test for avoiding equal protection concerns arising from the blood prong. United States
v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissenting).
346. Professor Clinton further wrote: "Recognition might be by society as a whole." But
there is little support for that proposition. See Clinton, supra note 91, at 516 (citing People
ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, 205 N.Y.S. 888 (Sup. Ct. 1924)).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 340-42.
348. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (1976) (citing BENNETr, supra note 54, at
8); see supra note 296 for discussion of this edition, the "Bennett Handbook."
349. CANBY, supra note 33, at 7; STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 20.
350. Clinton, supra note 91, at 576 (editors' note).
351. 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977).
352. 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (D.S.D. 1988).
353. 986 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1993).
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ment into each of the Rogers prongs. 35 4 In other words, to achieve
Indian status, an individual must have blood from a federally recognized tribe and be recognized as a member of a federally recognized tribe. 3 55 The Spokane Tribe argued in reply that no case has
mandated full incorporation for equal protection purposes. 3 56 "A
full incorporation would have the effect of diluting the ability of
tribal courts to establish jurisdiction over persons who have
clearly consented to tribal laws, simply because the tribe has not
endeavored to classify the person as a member of a particular
tribe."35 7 The Spokane Tribe offered that federal recognition of the
tribe should be incorporated either as a threshold question relative to the individual's claimed affiliation or by partially incorporating it into the blood prong of the Rogers test. 358
A universe of eight possible combinations may exist within
the Rogers framework, assuming that the tribe asserting jurisdiction is federally recognized:
Blood Prong
1) Indian Blood in
General (IBG)
2) IBG
3) IBG
4) IBG

5) Federally Recognized
Indian Blood (FRIB)
6) FRIB

+ Recognition Prong
+ Recognized as an Indian in
General (RIG);
+ Member of Tribe Asserting
Jurisdiction (MTAJ);
+ Member of Specific Other
Federally Recognized Tribe
(MSOFRT); 3 59
+ Member of Specific Other Tribe
Not Federally Recognized
(MSOTNFR)
+ RIG;
+ MTAJ;

354. Petitioner's Response to Spokane Tribe's Position Paper Pursuant to Court Order of
September 8, 2004 at 9-10, In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (No. CS-

03-0291-JLQ).
355. A list of tribes that are not federally recognized is available at http://www.kstrom.
net'isk/maps/tribesnonrec.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). For federally recognized tribes,
see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,193 (Nov. 25, 2005), availableat http://fact
finder.census.gov/home/aian/indian--entities-l1-25.pdf.
356. Spokane Tribe's Reply Pursuant to Court Order of September 8, 2004 at 12, In re
Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (No. CS-03-0291-JLQ).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 11-12.
359. Note that this interpretation has the same effect as the Lapier H threshold inquiry
of federal recognition of the tribe of claimed affiliation.
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+ MSOFRT;
+ MSOTNFR.

Combinations 1 and 5 were espoused by the Spokane Tribe. Only
combinations 5, 6 and 7 would be acceptable according to attorneys for Garvais. The Washington Court of Appeals has expressly
endorsed adding the federally recognized tribe requirement to the
second prong - encompassing combinations 2 and 3.36 0 Judge
Rymer's dissent in Bruce argued that only combinations 6 and 7
are satisfactory, and would further require that the blood quantum be at the level necessary for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe.3 6 1 Means v. Navajo Nation suggests disapproval of

combinations 1, 4, and

8.362

To further complicate matters, it is not clear whether the
blood and recognition prongs are dependent or independent variables. Some courts have implied that the less Indian blood in an
individual, the greater the presumption he or she is not recognized as an Indian. 3 63 Finally, in State v. Daniels, where the state
conceded defendant's Canadian Indian status, Judge Brown held
that defendant's "Canadian nationality does not divest him of his
racial identity." 6 4 Does this suggest that ancestry may be traced
to any tribe existing in the Americas prior to the period of discov3 66
ery by Europeans? 365 What if the non-Indian Peruvian in Lewis
had had South American Indian blood?
IV.

CONGRESSIONAL CALIBRATION OF THE

ROGERS

TEST

The Rehnquist Court has been described by one scholar as attempting to harmonize federal Indian law and the general law via
a "dormant plenary power impulse." 3 67 The most recent legislative
response to counter and restrain the Court's impulse was the
360. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
361. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissenting).
362. 432 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2005).
363. See supra text accompanying note 110.
364. Daniels, 16 P.3d at 654. Mr. Daniels claimed that his "father's people followed Sitting Bull into Canada." Id. at 651.
365. Compare COHEN, supra note 54, at 2 ("[t]hat some of his ancestors lived in America
before its discovery by the white race") with NEWTON, supra note 45, at 171-72 ("that some
of the individual's ancestors lived in what is now the United States before its discovery by
Europeans").
366. Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 877 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
367. Frickey, supra note 19, at 79; see generally Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supranote
18.
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Duro-fix.368 The conference committee report reads, in pertinent
part:
Throughout the history of this country, the Congress has never
questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians in the same manner that
such courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members.
Instead, the Congress has recognized that tribal governments afford
a broad array of rights and privileges to non-tribal members. Nontribal member Indians own property on Indian reservations, their
children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care
from tribal hospitals and clinics. Federally-administered programs
and services are provided to Indian people because of their status as
Indians without regard to whether their tribal membership is the
same as their reservation residence. The issue of Who is an Indian
for purposes of Federal law is well-settled as a function of two hundred years of Constitutionaland case law and Federal statutes.369

Yet no court, in deciding who is Indian for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction, has considered the effect of the Duro-fix.3 7 0 Instead,
the judiciary has moved far afield from the general principles established over the last two hundred years. Some courts have readily accepted St. Cloud's narrowing of the Indian status inquiry,
even though St. Cloud compromises the Rogers test by emphasizing enrollment 3 7 1 and introducing a hierarchy that was not wellsettled when Congress used its plenary powers to rewrite the
Court's narrow view of Indian history and government in Duro
1.372

368. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
369. H.R. REP. No. 102-61, at 5 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-938, at 132
(Conf. Rep)) (emphasis added).
370. The only observation by the Bruce Court was that the definition of "Indian" in the
ICRA seems to beg the question. 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005). The court failed to
consider the legislative context of the Duro-fix and its objectives. Judge Rymer, dissenting,
relied on the Supreme Court's dismissal of the contacts test without examining the implications of the Duro-fix. Id. at 1234-35 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
371. If federal definitions referencing tribal membership are interpreted to require
formal enrollment, they may exclude some non-enrolled individuals who are acknowledged participants in their tribal communities. For example, an individual
may speak the language, participate in religious ceremonies, and be the child of an
enrolled member. But if that particular tribe reckons membership through a person's mother, and the parent who is an enrolled member is the person's father, that
individual may not be eligible for formal enrollment. In fact, the concept of formal
enrollment has no counterpart in traditional tribal views of membership.
NEWTON, supra note 45, at 179.
372. The field of Indian law has an historical, as well as a contemporary, dimension.
In the two centuries of our national existence, Indians and Indian tribes have undergone profound changes in living habits, institutions, needs, and aspirations. Those
changes are perhaps more pronounced than the differences that separate AngloAmerican society from the ages for which Hammurabi, Moses, Lycurgus, or Justin-
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Now that the Lara Court has validated the inherent tribal
sovereignty over all Indians as expressed in the Duro-fix, 373 lower
courts should be mindful of Congressional intent and wary of precedent that does not consider Congress' restoration of significant
contacts within the second prong of the Rogers test. In particular,
when addressing the Rogers prongs in light of the Duro-fix, courts
should not deviate from the canon of statutory construction that
resolves all ambiguities in favor of Indian sovereignty.37 4 In doing
so, courts will be better equipped to avoid repeating past misinterpretations of the federal-tribal relationship. 375 Furthermore,
courts should apply the Duro-fix policy in the form of significant
contacts3 76 so as to broaden the conception of membership to include de facto membership and thus help avoid unconstitutional
applications of the ICRA amendment. 377 Finally, state and federal
courts should be aware of tribal court interpretations of Indian
status and consider the doctrine of comity now that the Duro-fix
has imposed the Rogers framework on both tribal and non-tribal
courts.
A.

The Prongs

It is well-settled that the Rogers test contains an ancestry or
blood prong.378 One scholar cites Nofire379 for the proposition that
blood need not be a consideration, 380 but the Rogers line of cases
does not support that interpretation, and the legislative history of
the Duro-fix clearly contemplates that the blood prong would be
the primary "racial" separator of Indians and non-Indians. Selfdescribed Indian-fighter Senator Slade Gorton's 38 1 main concern
ian legislated. Telescoped into a century and a half, therefore, one may find changes
in Indian social, political, and property relations that are at least as great as the
evolution of thirty centuries of European civilization.
STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 2.
373. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
374. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is
That?, 63 CAL.L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975), reprintedin GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERI-

ALs, supra note 343, at 127-29.
375. See, e.g., Duro H, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
376. The Supreme Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit's contacts analysis; Congress, by
implication, rehabilitated it in the Duro-fix, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000). See infra Part IV.B.
377. See, e.g., United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996).
378. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
379. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
380. See Clinton, supra note 91, at 516 n.60.
381. Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 17 (2004) (citing Lewis Kamb, Tribes Flex Growing Muscle at Ballot Box: 'Great
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was to prevent the Duro-fix from subjecting no-bloods to tribal
courts by blurring the legal boundary between Indians and nonIndians. 38 2 While the Duro-fix may be racist - its constitutional
Achilles' heel - there is no doubt that the ancestry element
presents a bright-line way to exempt from tribal criminal jurisdiction all but those who have Indian ancestors.
The majority rule from the case law discussed in Part III
shows that the prongs are not intended to be weighted. And the
blood prong is either satisfied or not. Given the high rate of intermarriage in Indian culture, 38 3 blood quanta of less than oneeighth should not be viewed as unusual by the courts. Moreover,
an individual's blood need not share the "blood-type" of the recognizing tribe.3 8 4 Rogers expressly referred to the "family of Indians"
and "the race generally." 38 5 By intending to affirm Indian tribal
power over all Indians, the Duro-fix is in accord. After Mancari,
however, it is unclear whether blood must be from a federally recognized tribe; 38 6 arguably, given the absence of such judicial lawmaking prior to the Duro-fix, the intent of Congress was that it
does not.
Next, the recognition prong is not the proper place for the federal recognition threshold question establishing the special relationship and responsibility of the federal government to the
tribe.3 8 7 The recognition is of the Indian, not the Indian tribe. The
tribe exercising jurisdiction, however, must be federally recognized. Thus, if an individual is not affiliated with another federally recognized tribe, the tribe exercising criminal jurisdiction
may prove that it recognizes the individual as an informal member.388 Otherwise, the inherent sovereignty to prosecute a nonmember Indian might violate equal protection in the absence of
substantial indicia of federal recognition.
Victory' over Gorton in 2000 Pointsthe Way, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 2004, at
Al).
382. Id.
383. See Gould, Mixing Bodies, supra note 30, at 757-59.
384. STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 23 n.27.
385. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
386. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 1224-25 (majority opinion) ("Nor have we required evidence of federal recognition. Rather, we have emphasized that there must be some evidence of government or
tribal recognition.").
388. "Informal member" may also be referred to as a "de facto member." United States v.
Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The term "member" itself does not mean that the individual is
enrolled or eligible for enrollment. 38 9 As the Ninth Circuit acknowledges, "Enrollment is not the only means to establish membership in a tribal political entity." 390 Thus, in theory, an Indian
could be a member of several tribes just as Indians possess multiple citizenships as federal, state, and tribal citizens today. For example, an Indian could be an enrolled member of one tribe, and
enjoy per capita payments and other privileges of that tribe, while
residing as a non-dividend member on another tribe's reservation.
The term "member" should be viewed merely as identifying which
tribe has recognized the individual as an Indian. In other words,
primary legal significance follows the "Indian" status determination; the secondary member/nonmember label with respect to Indian status is simply descriptive.
B. The Recognition Factors
The Supreme Court in Duro II dismissed the Ninth Circuit's
"significant contacts" test 391 because "the rationale of the test
would apply to non-Indians on the reservation as readily as to Indian nonmembers." 392 The Court, however, failed to consider that
the second Rogers prong is fundamentally based on socio-political
contacts. As demonstrated by the cases in Part III.B., the recognition prong can apply just as readily to individuals with no Indian
ancestry. 393 Only the blood prong prevents someone like Rogers
from having Indian status. All in all, the objective of the Rogers
test is to enable a more culturally sensitive means of political classification than the enrollment-driven one used in Mancari to circumvent the equal protection guarantee. Thus, if the Court cannot
accept this rationale for some form of a contacts test, then it must
389. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224.
390. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761.
391. Duro 1, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1988).
392. Duro 11, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990).
393. This Article uses the phrase "Indian by ancestry" as a broad category to include
some who may not have the legal status of an Indian. Other commentators have used the
descriptors "ethnologically Indian," "biologically Indian," or "racially Indian." COHEN, supra
note 54, at 2 (biological and ethnological); BENNETT, supra note 54, at 5 (biological and
ethnological); STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 19 (ethnological); Clinton, supra note 91, at
514, 520 (biological and ethnological); Dussias, supra note 25, at 80 (ethnological). However, the word ethnological requires an analysis of culture, thus creating a confusing overlap with the second prong of the Rogers test. Scientists have yet to find biologic or genetic
markers of Indianness. Race continues to be a controversial classification on account of its
indefinite, arbitrary nature.
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discard two hundred years of "well-settled"394 law embodied in the
Rogers test.
Fortunately, it appears that the Court might approve a contacts test for a tribe's descendants. 395 Justice Kennedy for the
Duro II majority wrote:
The contacts approach is little more than a variation of the argument that any person who enters an Indian community should be
deemed to have given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction
over him. We have rejected this approach for non-Indians [in Oliphant]. It is a logical consequence of that decision that nonmembers,
who share relevant jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians,
3 96
should share the same jurisdictional status.

While that characterization of the contacts approach may seem
logical as applied to the high degree of assimilation in Oliphant,it
is less relevant in the majority of Indian status cases, nor does it
do justice to the Duro facts. As evidenced by Duro I, there is an
order of magnitude difference between implied consent and significant contacts. And, after the Duro-fix, the Court must apply that
contacts approach to descendants of all tribes.
Although significant contacts do not go as far as the expressed
consent paradigm preferred by the Court, 397 they are a well-settled basis of the Rogers test. The Duro-fix thus overrides the
Court's aversion to contacts by restoring inherent sovereignty circumscribed by significant contacts. By endorsing the Rogers case
law, which rejects enrollment as the standard for political consent,
the Duro-fix does more than affirm the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians - it
resuscitates the meaning of Indian membership-based sovereignty
to include non-enrolled members. Accordingly, it matters little
whether such de facto or informal members share relevant jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians. What counts now is that
Congress' Rogers-based view of membership finds special relevance in ancestry as part of a unique legal status.
Significant contacts in a criminal context, as suggested by
this Article, are those socio-political contacts that rise above the
394. See supra text accompanying note 369.
395. In essence, the Duro II Court suggests that the relevant jurisdictional characteristics of member Indians are driven by what nonmember and non-Indians do not possess:
namely, descent from the federally recognized tribe exercising jurisdiction.
396. Duro H, 495 U.S. at 695-96.
397. Id. at 694 ("Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant
right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.").
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minimum contacts approach of the InternationalShoe3 98 line of
civil cases. Courts should view significant contacts as an approach
that restores the Indian status test and thereby helps non-Indian
judges avoid quick conclusions stemming from perceived differences between culture and politics. Moreover, the significant contacts approach helps to ensure a broad definition of member Indian under the Rogers test, thus minimizing potential for unconstitutional applications of the Duro-fix.
In the recognition prong approach used by courts today, no
one factor is dispositive, yet courts are lulled into mainly relying
on the questionable objectivity of BIA rolls. Modern enrollment
policy aims to protect scarce resources and create behavioral type
incentives necessary for the internal strength and cohesion of a
tribe. Enrollment is strong evidence of Indianness, but the negative is not necessarily true. 39 9 That is, a lack of enrollment or eligibility for enrollment should not weigh in the balance. 40 0 Furthermore, nineteenth century views of civilized versus non-civilized, Anglo-American culture versus Indian culture, or integrated
versus separated should not be allowed to function as relevant dichotomies. The recognition factors, to be fair and to avoid cultural
misconceptions, must be viewed as additive, just like contacts. In
short, the absence of any one factor should not offset the presence
of another.
398. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The original holding in InternationalShoe used the term "sufficient contacts or ties" - not "significant" - to describe a
"quality and nature" of activities that "were neither irregular nor casual" but were "systematic and continuous."
399. Charles Park, Enrollment: Proceduresand Consequences, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109,
110 (1975):
Although enrollment is the most obvious evidence of tribal membership, care must
be used in ascertaining the specific purpose for which a roll is made. Payment of
money to tribal members under statutes and treaties depends upon enrollment, as
do voting rights in tribal elections and the capacity to be an elected official of the
tribe. Probably most important, however, is the connection between tribal property and enrollment, because allotments of land can be made only to enrolled
members.
See also Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.29:
In some cases, not enrolling may be a protest against Indian Reorganization Act
governments seen as federally imposed or may be an expression of religious or
cultural conviction. In other cases, the tribe itself may be lax about keeping its
rolls up to date, allowing benefits and political participation to many who are not
enrolled (and in some cases not even technically eligible for enrollment under the
tribe's own constitution). Indians do not have to enroll formally to obtain tribal
benefits in many tribes; some even have a separate roll for internal purposes or an
informal "census roll."
400. See supra notes 371, 399.
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In particular, St. Cloud's hierarchical factors should be disordered and unweighted. The "well-settled" Rogers test allows
tribes, as social and political quasi-sovereigns, the power to determine their membership. A fundamental aspect of sovereignty is, of
40 1
course, the ability to determine membership in the sovereign.
"Social" factors should not be relegated to the bottom of the court's
consideration list. Similarly, Anglo-American concepts of the political (e.g. democratic voting) must not predominate over what is
40 2
rightfully the group's view of its own identity and membership.
For example, one can have a political effect without being able
to vote. State and federal courts should accord comity to tribal
courts in this regard. In Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, Chief Justice Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court observed that Means, a member of the Oglala Sioux Nation,
claimed he was not allowed to vote or attain any political office
within the Navajo Nation, but was able to attend chapter meetings and "led a march to the court house for a demonstration to
make a 'broad statement' about political activities of the Navajo
Nation."40 3 Nevertheless, conflating enrollment with membership
and without even addressing the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit
held that "[als an Oglala-Sioux, Means can never become a member of the Navajo political community, no matter how long he
40 4
makes the Navajo reservation his home."
Lastly, it seems settled that the federal government might
recognize someone as an Indian even though no tribe intervenes to
testify and there is no other evidence of tribal recognition. 40 5 In
that situation it might be helpful for the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to help assess the significance of the more subjective
cultural contacts.4 06

401. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
402. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.63 (questioning imposition of Lockean social contract theory on Indian tribes).
403. Means v. Dist. Ct. of the Chinle Jud. Dist., 26 Indian Law Rptr. 6083, 6085 (Navajo
Nation Sup. Ct. 1999).
404. Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
405. See State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
406. Ideally, each tribe would appoint a representative to act in the best interests of
tribal sovereignty. In the alternative, a federally appointed guardian ad litem would be
consonant with the wardship relationship and responsibility.
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POST-LARA OBSERVATIONS

It is now apparent that the judiciary created a constitutional
crisis by choosing a myopic view of Indian membership, resulting
in the tremendous number of Indians categorized as nonmembers.
Had it not been for the relatively recent erosion of broadly defined
Indian member status under federal common law, the Duro decision would have had little impact on tribal sovereignty and there
would have been little political impetus for a "fix." By returning to
the pre-1990 reality of Indian status, more Indians would be
deemed non-enrolled members rather than as nonmembers or
non-Indians. With the Duro-fix as statutory guide, it is time for
the courts to restore the concept of membership espoused by the
Rogers Court and Felix Cohen, which includes recognition of an
individual as an Indian by his or her tribe or community. 40 7 Thus,
the constitutional crisis may be averted to a great extent by harmonizing the Duro I decision and the Duro-fix legislation through
a definition of Indian status based on significant contacts. The interpretation of the Indian status test suggested by this Article, as
compared to other interpretations, has the advantage of alignment with the congressional intent of the Duro-fix. In addition, a
similar notion of significant contacts between ethnic Indians and
the federal government solves the problem of nonmember Indians,
who by the definition recommended in this Article are recognized
by another tribe and have insignificant contacts with the tribe exercising criminal jurisdiction.
Congress also could nullify the racial attack by acknowledg40 8
ing that tribal criminal jurisdiction is a function of membership
or recognized consent, and need not be linked to race. This would
entail dropping the first prong from the Rogers test and would respect the wishes of some tribes to decide that a specific blood
quantum is not a requirement of membership. To this aim, courts
over the last century have proven able to distinguish the Rogers
407. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
408. Citizenship is the preferred term because membership connotes a club rather than
a semi-sovereign nation. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 437, 437 n.3 (2002). Professor
Goldberg
came to believe that the term "membership" is used in tribal constitutions rather
than "citizenship" because the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not treat these constitutions as charters for governments. Rather, they viewed them as some variation
on private associations or student councils, designed to instruct Indian people in
self-government rather than to facilitate genuine self-determination.
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recognition prong from the general legal norms of territorial sovereignty and implied consent. Accordingly, the concerns represented by former Senator and Washington Attorney General
Slade Gorton 40 9 can be given adequate deference because membership is not based on geography. Tribal criminal jurisdiction
could be easily avoided, for example, by reservation residents who
eschew sustained socio-political contact with the tribe.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The question of who is an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction is considered by Congress to be a well-settled area of
law as a result of two hundred years of common law and federal
legislation. This Article demonstrates, however, that the judicial
branches of state and federal government do not often agree with
that congressional assessment. The challenges of federal Indian
law are only growing more complicated due to tribal demographic
trends. 4 10 Like the Israelites in the diaspora, Indians today are
confronted with the problem of maintaining a sense of identity in
the face of a dominant culture that views society through the lens
of integration and separation. This Article exhorts the judiciary to
focus less on formal enrollment 4 ll and to restore the second prong
of the Rogers test to its proper role as a measurement of Indian
tribal identification in the socio-political sense. Courts must meet
the challenge of sifting the grain of Indian status from the chaff
within recent lower court decisions. Only by so doing will the congressional intent of the Duro-fix be honored and the pressure of
equal protection concerns be relieved.
409. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Attorney General, State of Washington, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (No. 76-5729). See supra text accompanying
notes 381-82.
410. See generally Gould, Mixing Bodies, supra note 30.
411. Motivated in part by Equal Protection concerns, the dissent proposes a new test
for determining Indian status; one that would conflate our two-pronged Rogers inquiry and multifaceted "recognition" guidelines into a single question: whether the
individual is enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe. From
a purely conceptual standpoint, we agree that eligibility for enrollment provides a
simpler framework within which we might judge Indian status as a political affiliation with a formerly sovereign people. Nonetheless, it is not the test that we have
adopted, and until either Congress acts or the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of
our court revises the "recognition" prong of the Rogers test, we are bound by our
prior jurisprudence. In particular, we are bound by the body of case law which holds
that enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is not dispositive of Indian
status. In sum, we are not permitted to hold that these cases do not mean what they
say.
Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted).
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